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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal from
the final order in hunt v. Lance, Civil No. 020500612 dated May 11, 2006 pursuant to
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court error by ruling sua sponte on the issue of abandonment

despite the fact that the issue was not raised by either party or tried before the court?
2.

Did the trial court error by limiting the prescriptive easement to twenty feet

in width when its findings of fact specifically state the width of the Lane is 34 feet across
and when it limited the length of the Lane to 180 feet when the testimony of the parties
indicated the length of the Lane was between 235 and 247 feet.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Issues on Appeal:

Issue 1:

Whether Judge Schofield erred by not granting a new trial because of

alleged bias by the trial judge is an issue Utah appellate courts review only for abuse of
discretion. State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, Tf 8 (Utah 2000) (we review decision to grant or
deny motion for new trial only for abuse of discretion).
Issue 2:

The question of whether the elements of a prescriptive easement were met

by clear and convincing evidence is a highly fact-intensive issue for which trial courts are
granted broad discretion. An appellate court will overturn the trial courts findings only if

--i-

there is an abuse of this broad discretion. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah
1998).
Issue 3:

A trial court is given broad discretion in making factual findings based on

the witness testimony. As such, these findings will only be reversed if they are found to
be "clearly erroneous." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, % 49 (Utah
2004).
II.

Issues on Cross-Appeal:

Issue 1:

The issues of whether the trial court erred when it ruled on the issue of

abandonment and if its application of abandonment was correct are questions of law,
which are reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Olds (In re Gen.
Determination of Rights to the Use of Water), 2004 UT 106 ^ 16 (UT 2004).
Issue 2:

The issue of limiting an easement is a question of the scope of the

easement, a finding of fact for which great deference is given to the trial court in its
findings. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); McBride v. McBride, 581
P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). Therefore, a trial court will be overturned only if it exceeds
its broad discretion. Id.
Ill
III
III
III
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

In 2002, Garth Lunt, Trustee ("Mr. Lunt") brought suit against Harold and
I

Diane Lance ("the Lances"), in the Fourth District Court. The Lances countersued
asserting numerous causes of action. The only issues remaining at trial were claims for
boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement. (R. at 621).
2.

These two issues were heard by the Fourth Judicial District Court Wasatch

County, State of Utah during bench trial held on November 1-2, 2005. (R. at 729-730).
The Trial Court found that Mr. Lunt established a prescriptive easement by clear and
convincing evidence. (R. at 729-30.) The boundary by acquiescence claims were
dismissed. Id.
3.

On March 24, 2006, nearly five (5) months after the trial, the Lances filed a

Motion and Affidavit for a Rule 63(b) Removal of Judge. (R. at 791). On the first day of
trial, Judge Pullan noted that he was consulted about a boundary line issue in his capacity
as the County Attorney and that he had no recollection with whom he'd spoken. (R. at
841.) Both parties "made an affirmative determination at that time that they had no
concerns about a possible conflict of interest." Id. Through subsequent research, the
Lances discovered that the property came before the Heber City Planning Commission for
a requested zone change and that Judge Pullan was the acting chair of the commission
that recommended a zone change requested by Moneves Boren. Id. Ms. Boren
subsequently testified as a witness during the bench trial. Id. Judge Taylor ruled that
-3-

Rule 63 was not appropriate and declined to set aside the Judge Pullan's ruling or the
trial, but provided that Judge Schofield should handle further proceedings as necessary in
order to avoid the appearance of impropriety. (Id. at 839-40).
4.

On May 25, 2006, the Lances moved for new trial or in the alternative to

amend judgment or take additional testimony based on Rule 59 and Rule 60, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. (R. at 892). Judge Schofield denied the motion under Rule 59 stating
that Judge Pullan had the responsibility to "judge the credibility of competing witness
testimony" and then make decisions. (R. at 932). Judge Schofield further determined that
Judge Pullan's involvement with the planning commission "did not create a bias or
prejudice which justifies a new trial in this matter." Id. Judge Schofield further denied
relief to the Lances under Rule 60(b) for failing "to state a reason that justifies relief and
ruling that the Lances' " 'sincere and compelling belief that plaintiff in fact did not use
the Lane in the manner asserted by plaintiffs witnesses and found by the Court' is
insufficient to justify relief." Id.
5.

The final judgment which established a prescriptive easement and denied

the boundary by acquiescence was signed by the Court on May 11, 2006. (R. 846-843).
6.

On January 8, 2007, the Lances filed their Amended Notice of Appeal from

the judgment and orders entered by the Court on May 11, 2006. (R. 946).
///
///
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S1A1LMLN1 OFRELKVAM *AC1S
1.

Mr. Garth Lunt (Mr. Lunt) owns property at 205 North 600 West. (R. 958

at 131).
2.

Mr. Lunt is successor in interest to Lincoln McNaughten and his family (the

"McNaughtens"). Lincoln McNaughten was the step-father of Jack Lunt, Monaves
Boren, and Garth Lunt (trustee of the Plaintiff trust). (R. 958 at 131-132).
3.

The Lances own the property immediately south of the Mr. Lunt's property.

They acquired it in 1991. (R. 959 at 205).
4.

The Lances are successors in interest to Frank Witt and his Family ("the

Witts"). (R.958).
5.

Between these two properties is the Lane which gives rise to this dispute.

(R. 958).
6.

Mr. Eldon Carlisle testified that in the 1920's and 1930's, the McNaughtens,

used the Lane to drive their cattle to and access their back acreage. Mr. Carlisle testified
that he helped the McNaughten's run cows down the Lane during the 1930's. R. 958 at
126-127.
7.

Mr. Carlisle testified that the Lane was used as a driveway as early as the

late 1920's. (R. 958 at 127).
8.

Mr. Carlisle testified that after he returned from military service in 1946,

-5-

the McNaughtens continued to run cattle down the Lane as they had previously. He
recalled seeing the McNaughtens use the Lane in this manner through the 1950?s and up
until the early 1990fs. (R. 958 at 119, 128).
9.

Mr. Carlisle testified that neither the Witts nor the McNaughtens ever

objected to the use of the Lane by the other. (R. 958 at 118, 121).
10.

The Lances' witness Mr. Duane C. Smith, who testified he drove cattle for

the McNaughtens as a child in the late 1930's and worked for them during the 1940fs
stated he never took the McNaughten's cows down the Lane. (R. 959 at 248).
11.

The Lances' witness Mr. Duane Smith testified that at one time the Lunts

used a different access to their properly other than just the Lane. (R. 959 at 253).
12.

After weighing the testimony, the trial court found that "Mr. Eldon

Carlisle's testimony concerning use of the Lane from the 1930's to the 1950's was
particularly credible." (R. 728).
13.

Ms. Monaves Boren testified that from the late 1940's the Lane was used by

her parents, the McNaughtens, to park cars and move cows and equipment up and down
the Lane. (R. 958 at 64).
14.

From 1950 to 1955 Ms. Boren assisted her parents in milking and driving

the cows and harvesting hay. (R. 958 at 62). Both families continued to use the Lane and
park their cars on the Lane throughout that time. Ms. Boren also testified that use of the

-6-

Lane to put cattle in the rear pastures of the Lunt property has not stopped to her
knowledge. (R. 958 at 64).
15.

Jack Lunt testified that the McNaughtens and Witts used the Lane without

permission from each other, to move equipment, mowing machines, and deliver)7 rakes to
and from the rear acreage of the property. (R. 958 at 14).
16.

Jack Lunt also testified that the McNaughtens and Lunts moved cattle back

and forth on the Lane and took bob sleighs and wagons down the Lane. (R. 958 at 30).
17.

The Lances' witness, Ms. Frankie Housel testified that the Lane was used

as a driveway to the Witt's property. (R. 959 at 264).
18.

Garth Lunt testified that the Lane had existed "forever, as far as [he] knew."

(R. 958 at 134). He testified that after 1954, he observed the Lane being used by the
Witt's and himself for hauling hay to their respective barns, moving farm equipment,
moving cattle, and recalls the Lane was used for these and other ingress/egress purposes.
(R. 958 at 138). He testified that these uses were made of the property until the early
1990's. Id.
19.

Mr. Garth Lunt testified that the Lane provided agricultural and residential

access the McNaughten's, and subsequently Mr. Lunt's properly and was mutually used
by the Witts, McNaughtens, and Mr. Lunt and his siblings to access the property through
at least the 1990's. (R. 958 at 68-70).
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20.

Sometime in the mid to late 1980's, Mr. Lunt began leasing the

McNaughten home and accessory apartment to tenants. From that time to the present, the
tenants leasing the property have continually used the Lane as a driveway to access the
back apartment. (R. 958 at 91, 182-183). Mr. Lunt also testified that the Lane has been
used to put cattle on the back property "to this day." (R. 958 at 182).
21.

Ms. Boren testified the Lane was 35 feet in width. (R. 958 at 66).

22.

Mr. Garth Lunt testified the Lane was 34 to 35 feet in width.

(R. 958 at 135-136).
23.

The Lances' witness Mr. Duane Smith testified the Lane was about 40 feet

in width. (R. 959 at 258).
24.

The Lances' witness, Ms. Frankie Housel (the Witt's granddaughter), who

did not physically measure the Lane testified the length of the Lane was approximately
200 feet from the grainery, which was located a distance up the Lane next to the Witt
home. (R. 959 at 264-267).
25.

According to Lance's witness Frank Pia, who did not physically measure

the easement, it appeared to him from photographs that the length of the Lane was
approximately 150-175 feet. (R. 959 at 322).
26.

According to Lances' witness Duane Smith, who was basing the length of

the Lane from his memory, the length of the easement was approximately 150-200 feet
from 6th West to the barn. (R. 959 at 258).

-8-

27.

Ms. Boren testified that she personallyrn.easu.redthe Lane and the length of

the Lane was approximately 235 feet from the edge of the asphalt on 6th West to the end
of the Lane where the McNaughtens and the Lunts accessed the rear acreage of their
property. (R. 958 at 67-68).
28.

Jack Lunt testified that he personally measured the Lane and the length of

the Lane was approximately 247 feet from the road back to the barn and access to the rear
acreage of the property. (R. 958 at 29).
29.

Garth Lunt testified that a fence ran alongside the Lane and a 10 foot gate at

the end of the fence allowed them to enter the Lunt barn and property. He testified that
the Lane terminated at the old Witt barn at the end of the Lane. (R. 958 at 136, 186.)
30.

Garth Lunt testified that he personally measured the Lane from the road to

the end of the Lane and the length of the Lane equaled

; feet (160 ft+15 ft+62 ft+10

ft). (R. 958 at 185-186).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

Summary of Arguments In Response to Appeal
The Lances allegations of perceived bias are insufficient to warrant a new trial in

this case. Judge Pullan's involvement as vice-chair of the Heber City Planning
Commission prior to admittance to the bench is by itself not evidence of actual prejudice
and thus demonstrative of bias sufficient for a new trial. See State v. Alonzo, 973 P 2d
975, 979 (Utah 1998). The Lances fail to demonstrate that Judge Pullan took any

-9-

"extreme" actions or exhibited a "deep-seated antagonism" toward them, and therefore
fail to allege bias sufficient to warrant a new trial. See State Interest ofM.L., 965 P.2d
551, 556 (Utah Ct.App. 1998).
The trial courts finding that Mr. Lunt holds a prescriptive easement cannot be
overturned. Trial courts are granted broad discretion to in easement cases because they
are fact intensive decisions and trial courts are in the best decision to hear, weigh, and
determine whether testimony is clear and convincing. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,
1256 (Utah 1998). They can only be overturned if they exceed this broad discretion. Id,
The trial court did not exceed its broad discretion in this case. The testimony of the
witnesses was clear and convincing that Mr. Lunt and his predecessors openly,
notoriously, and adversely used the Lane for more than twenty years. Mar chant v. Park
City, 788 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990). The Lances fail to marshal evidence that proves
otherwise. See Hogle v. Zinetics Med, Inc., 2002 UT 121, \ 16 (Utah 2002).
II.

Summary of Arguments on Cross-Appeal
The trial court erred by ruling on the issue of abandonment when that issue was not

raised or tried before the court. In Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns Inc, the
Supreme Court precludes trial court's from "granting of relief on issues neither raised nor
tried." 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984). In this case, the issue of abandonment was not
raised in the pleadings or the trial court, the Lances failed to raise the issue, and the Mr.

-10-

Lunt did •

»ve sufficient notice for the trial court to rule on this issue. See Cowley v.

Porter, 2005 UT App 518 (UT Ct.App. 2005).
Even if this Court were to find the trial court was within its authority to rule on the
issue of abandonment, the elements of abandonment were not met. While an easement
may be abandoned in Utah, Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182
(Utah 1977), an intent to abandon and actual abandonment of an easement must be
demonstrated by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence for the trial court to declare
an easement abandoned. State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84 ^f 14 (Utah 2005) (citing Linscomb
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir. 1952)); see also Lucky Seven
Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 753 (UT App. 1988). The Lances failed to raise, let
alone prove by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that Mr. Lunt (1)
demonstrated an intent to abandon his easement in the Lane; and (2) actually abandoned
the Lane.
ARGUMENT
(RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS ItKIF.F)
The Lances appeal three issues: (1) The denial of their motion for a new trial based
on grounds that the trial judge was not impartial because he acted as chair of the Heber
City Planning Commission when the commission changed the zoning on the subject
property in 1998; (2) the trial court did not apply the proper test for prescriptive
easements; and (3) the Lances' witnesses were more credible than the Plaintiff Mr. Lunt's

-11-

and therefore the trial court's decision that Mr. Lunt's witnesses established an easement
by clear and convincing evidence was wrong.
The trial judge was an impartial finder of facts in this case. Near the beginning of
trial, Judge Pullan raised the issue of his recollection of prior experience with the property
with the Lances and Mr. Lunt. Neither party objected to his continued presence on the
case or sought to disqualify him at that time. In regards to the second issue, the record
supports the trial court's finding that a prescriptive easement existed by clear and
convincing evidence. Finally, in response to the last issue, a trial judge is granted broad
discretion in determining the credibility of witnesses. Simply because the Lances
disagree with the trial court's determination of credibility does not make Lunt's witnesses
less credible or the findings of fact less clear and convincing.
Mr. Lunt on cross-appeal also requests review of the trial court's finding of
abandonment and of the final length and width of the prescriptive easement ordered by
the trial court.
L

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE APPELLANTS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE PULLAN.

The Utah Supreme Court will not find a trial court has abused its discretion and
grant a new trial based on allegations of perceived bias alone. See Edgell v. Canning,
1999 UT 21, Tj 12 (Utah 1999). In Utah, judges are presumed to be qualified. In re
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 1997) (citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 218
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(1994)). They also are not required to hear a case with no existing personal biases or
opinions. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "[although litigants are entitled to a
judge who will hear both sides and decide an issue on the merits of the law and the
evidence presented, they are not entitled to a judge whose mind is a clean slate." Madsen
v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1988). In other words, it is
neither possible nor recommended for a judge leave a "lifetime of experiences" and the
opinions and attitudes generated therefrom in his or her chambers before taking the
bench. Id. at 546.
One party's alleged bias by the trial court cannot be based solely on the fact that a
judge has issued prior rulings adverse to the party making the allegation. See In re
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d at 1154 (stating '"no deduction of bias and prejudice may be
made from adverse rulings by a judge.'") (quoting 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 219 (1994)).
Instead, such bias can be shown to exist only if "apart from [the judge's] analysis of the
issues of fact or law [in those prior proceedings], he had such a bias in favor of one party
or prejudice against the other that he could not fairly and impartially determine the
issues." See State Interest ofM.L, 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct.App. 1998)(quoting
Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 742 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). Indeed, for assertions of bias
to meet the standard warranting a new trial, the asserting party must demonstrate that the
judge demonstrated "extreme" actions and a "deep-seated antagonism" against them in
the prior proceedings such that he or she cannot "fairly and impartially determine the
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issues. Id. The Supreme Court held in the Edgell v. Canning case, a case with a similar
fact pattern, that error based on the trial court's perceived bias will not be presumed.
Edgell v. Canning, 1999 UT 21, If 12 (Utah 1999).
Finally, it is a well-recognized rule that an application for the disqualification of a
trial judge must be filed a the earliest opportunity. Madsen, 756 P.2d at 543. Therefore,
when a trial judge discloses personal experience with or participation in previous
proceedings involving the parties, any affected party, if they so desire, should
immediately object to continuing the proceedings, or at the very least ask for a
continuance to consider disqualification. Id.
A.

The Lances' Allegations Fail to Demonstrate Facts that Any Bias or
Actual Prejudice Was Shown. In Addition, the Lances Made No
Objection To Judge Pullan Staying on the Case.

The Lances' allegations of bias are based solely on a previous decision made by
the Heber City Planning Commission that affected the zoning on the subject property.
Judge Pullan was a member of this commission prior to being admitted to the bench.
However, prior experience with the subject property as the acting chair of a sevenmember planning commission is insufficient for the Lances' allegations of bias to warrant
a new trial. The zoning decision was made on September 24, 1998 and does not
demonstrate any hint of bias. R. 767. The minutes of the meeting reveal that Monaves
Moren requested to change the zoning on the property from RA-2 to R-2 zoning. R. 766.
No one attended to speak against her request. Id. Commission member Harry Zane made
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a motion to approve the zone change, the motion was seconded by Sherman Christen,
another Commission member, and the motion carried unanimously. Id, The fact that
Judge Pullan was a member of this seven-member committee before he was even
admitted to the bench does not demonstrate any bias toward the Lances.
The Lances have not alleged or raised any facts to demonstrate that Judge Pullan
engaged in any "extreme" actions or demonstrated udeep-seated antagonism" toward
them in this previous interaction. See State Interest ofM.L., 965 P.2d at 556 (Utah
Ct.App. 1998). To the contrary, the only allegation maintained by the Lances is that
Judge Pullan was acting chairman1 of the commission that made a zoning decision
regarding the property. The Lances cite to State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah
1998) in support of the proposition that appearance of bias may be grounds for reversal if
actual prejudice is shown." However, as previously stated, the Lances fail to allege actual
prejudice. Mere involvement on a seven-member planning commission eight years prior
to trial is not actual prejudice. They have presented no evidence of bias. On its own, this
involvement fails to demonstrate the seven-member commission's unanimous decision
creates some sort of judicial bias in the underlying dispute.
In addition, no objection was raised by the Lances when informed of this prior
experience. When Judge Pullan, on his own accord, noted to the parties that he recalled

1

Judge Pullan was the vice-chairman of the commission. He conducted the vote in this
case because the Chairman did not arrive until a few minutes after the vote had been taken after
which time the chairman took over the meeting. See R. 766.
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dealing with a boundary line issue on the subject property in the past (R. 958 58:17-21),
the Lances neither objected to continuing the proceedings nor requested a continuance to
consider disqualifying Judge Pullan. 2 See Madsen at 543. Instead, Lances' counsel, who
conferred with his clients prior to speaking, stated "My clients have not been involved
with you. They don't recognize you. They don't recall anything like that. All their
property is in Heber City, so I don't know if you had jurisdiction (inaudible)." R. 958 at
59:9-12. The Lances should have objected against proceeding with trial or requested a
continuance to consider disqualification at that time. Apparently it was not an issue then
and because they have failed to demonstrate any actual bias, the Lances' mere allegations
of bias at this late juncture are insufficient to warrant a new trial.
B.

The Lances Allegations of Bias Were Heard By Both Judge Taylor and
Judge Schofield, Who Both Denied the Allegations and Refused to
Overturn Judge Pullan's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Regardless, the Lances were able to address their concern of bias to different
judges on two separate occasions: (1) in their rule 63(b)(2) Motion to Disqualify Judge
Pullan which was heard by Judge Taylor; and (2) in their Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial
heard by Judge Schofield. Judge Taylor, while accepting Mrs. Lances' affidavit alleging
bias as requisite certification under rule 63, refused to overturn the findings and turned

2

In their statement of the case paragraph 3, the Lances on appeal cite to the record at 958
p. 58 and assert that Judge Pullan stated he was familiar with the property, having been involved
in a "boundary dispute" while serving as county attorney. This is misstates the record. Judge
Pullan never stated he was party to a "boundary dispute." It was his recollection that he " was
consulted about a boundary line issue," something far different from a "boundary dispute."
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the case over to Judge Schofield simply to avoid "the appearance of impropriety" that
could remotely be inferred if Judge Pullan continued with the trial. See R. at 839.
However, when the issue of bias sufficient to warrant a new trial was heard by
Judge Schofield, he firmly denied the Lances' allegations of bias on the following
grounds:
[Judge Pullan's] involvement as a member of the planning commission did not
create a bias or prejudice which justifies a new trial in this matter. As Chairman of
the planning commission, Judge Pullan was one of several members of that body
who dealt with the issue of [the] property. He did not act alone. Additionally, at
the beginning of the trial Judge Pullan remembered his previous involvement with
[the] property and asked the parties if they objected to his trying the case. At that
time, neither party objected. Having failed to object at that time, when the issue
was squarely addressed to the parties by Judge Pullan, [the Lances] cannot now be
heard to complain. Judge Pullan's involvement with the plaintiffs property does
not warrant a new trial.
R. 932-31. In their Rule 59 motion, the Lances could not cite to any clear or convincing
evidence that any hint of bias existed and their request for a new trial was properly
denied. Their argument on appeal remains unchanged. They are unable to produce any
facts sufficient to demonstrate any actual or implied bias in this case and their request on
appeal for a new trial is not warranted and should be denied.
The Lances' unchanged allegations of bias based solely on the fact that Judge
Pullan served as acting chairman of the Heber City Planning Commission prior to his
appointment to the bench are insufficient to warrant a new trial. The fact that the trial
court issued a ruling adverse to the Lances interests does not show "deep-seated
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antagonism" or even prejudice. See State Interest ofM.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah
CtApp. 1998).
II.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN IT'S BROAD
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
AND CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THE EXISTENCE OF A
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT.

A.

Standard of Review

The finding of a prescriptive easement is a conclusion of law in which a trial court
is granted broad discretion. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). While
typically courts of appeal review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness,
according the trial court no legal deference, the standard of review for a prescriptive
easement is different. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "such a finding is the type
of highly fact-dependant question, with numerous potential fact patterns, which accords
the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to
the given set of facts. Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256. Therefore, the finding of an easement
will only be overturned if the appellate court finds that the trial judge's decision exceeded
the broad discretion granted. Id. (emphasis added). Great deference is granted in the
easement context because trial judges have close proximity to the parties, the witnesses,
the exhibits and the trial. Id. In addition, trial judges are better able to weigh conflicting
evidence and decide what weight is to be given to the testimony of those witnesses that
testify at trial. See Pollesche v. TransAmerican Insurance Co., 497 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah
1972). The trial court, having reviewed the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits
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produced at trial, correctly ruled that the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated
the existence of a prescriptive easement in the Lane.
B.

The Elements for a Prescriptive Easement Were Met by the Testimony
of the Witnesses and the Exhibits Entered Into Evidence.

The elements of a prescriptive easement are met when the party claiming a
prescriptive easement can prove that use of another's land was open, continuous, and
adverse under a claim of right for a period of twenty years. Mar chant v. Park City, 788
P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990) (citing Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984)). The
evidence to establish a prescriptive easement must be clear and convincing. Mar chant v.
Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). In this case, the trial court correctly
found that the evidence was clear and convincing that use of the Lane was open,
notorious, and adverse for over twenty years, thus meeting this standard. Therefore, the
trial court's decision regarding the existence of a prescriptive easement should be
affirmed.
Where adjoining property owners, or their predecessors, jointly establish and use a
Lane or driveway, this use meets the requirement of being open, notorious, adverse and
continuous if done for a period of 20 years and establishes a prescriptive right to its
continued use. Ortonv. Carter, 920 P.2d 1254, 1259 (Utah 1998). Testimony presented
by the witnesses shows the open, notorious and adverse use of the Lane by the
McNaughtens and Lunts for at least twenty years. In fact, the testimony from Plaintiffs
witnesses and the property pictures entered into evidence as exhibits, demonstrate open,
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notorious and adverse use of the Lane in its current location for over eighty (80) years,
from the late 1920's to the present. Testimony from Mr. Eldon Carlisle, which the trial
court noted was "was particularly credible," established that the Lane existed and was in
use by Mr. Lunt's predecessors the McNaughtens and the Lances' predecessors in
interest, the Witts, from the 1920?s and 1930's through the 1950fs. See R. 958 at 114-127;
see also R. 728. As the testimony of Monaves Boren shows, the Lane was used as a
driveway for agricultural and residential purposes from the 1940fs to the present. R. 59112; see also R. 737-732. The trial judge listened to the testimony of the witnesses,
reviewed the pictures of the Lane over the years, evaluated and weighed the evidence, and
found that there was clear and convincing of the existence of a prescriptive easement.
Mr. Lunt and his predecessors have openly, notoriously, and adversely used the Lane for
at least eighty years.
As in the Orton case where the Utah Supreme Court found the existence of a
prescriptive easement, the facts presented at trial in this case showed a common use of the
road by the parties predecessors starting in the 1920's. In his findings, Judge Pullan
wrote:
The Defendant's contend that use of the Lane by the McNaughtens was by
permission, and therefore not adverse to Witts' interests. Ms. Housel testified that
her Grandfather Witt was "particular about protecting the Lane." However, the
weight of the evidence demonstrates clearly and convincingly otherwise.
R. at 729. The trial court correctly found that the evidence presented before it clearly and
convincingly demonstrated that Mr. Lunt and his predecessors' the McNaughtens use of
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the Lane was open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of at least
twenty years. See Marchant v. Park CityJSS P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990).
C.

Conflicting Evidence Does Not Prevent the Trial Court From Finding
That The Existence of a Prescriptive Easement Was Clear and
Convincing.

While the Lances are correct that conflicting evidence was presented before the
trial court, this is the nature of the judicial system, and conflicting evidence alone is
insufficient grounds for dismissal. See State v. Robbins, 142 P.3d 589 (Utah App. 2006).
Conflicting evidence and even witness testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion
does not justify the reversal of judgement because it is the " exclusive province of the trial
judge. ..to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends." Id, (citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1342
(1975)) (emphasis added).
The assertion by the Lances that the contradictory evidence presented by their
witnesses proves the evidence for a prescriptive easement could not be clear and
convincing is without merit. It undermines the broad discretion granted to a trial court in
weighing the testimony, exhibits, and other evidence accordingly. It also fails to
recognize that every trial has contradictory evidence by the very nature of the judicial
system. The Lances' argument for the granting of a new trial is that contradictory
evidence was presented and therefore the trial court could not satisfy the clear and
convincing standard necessary to show the existence of a prescriptive easement. Without
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a showing that the trial court abused its broad discretion, conflicting evidence is not
grounds for reversal, therefore this argument fails to meet the standard of reversal. See
Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256; see also State v. Robbins, 142 P.3d 589 (Utah App. 2006).
In addition, their reliance on the record to support their arguments is misplaced .
The record is clear and convincing that a prescriptive easement exists. For example, the
Lances cite the record at page 61 stating "Ms. Boren testified that she did not work on
the farm at the property in question" and page 90, that Ms. Boren "did not use the Lane in
the milking of cows" as evidence that her testimony is contradictory and self-serving, and
as evidence that the Lane was not used as she testified. See Appellant's Brief at 21. The
Lances' misinterpret the record. Ms. Boren did not testify she "did not work on the
farm," she stated "I did not work the farm." R. at 61. This statement is true but
irrelevant. Ms. Boren did not "work the farm." As she later testifies, the farm belonged
to her step-father Link McNaughten, who worked his own farm. She does testify that she
worked on the farm. She milked cows on the land (R. at 61), lived at the property (R. at
60), she and her husband helped Link gather his hay (R. at 61), she was very familiar with
the subject property (R. at 63), and she was familiar with the Lane at the heart of this
dispute (R. at 63:24-64:1). The fact that she did not plow the fields, plant the seeds,
irrigate the hay, and run the hay rake herself, or in other words "work the farm," fails to
demonstrate that her testimony is self-serving. This testimony does not deal with the time
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of use, method of use, or scope of the Lane and does not support the Lances' argument
that the evidence is not clear and convincing .
Disturbingly, the Lances also try to paint Mr. Carlisle as an interested party to this
case by stating the Lunt's predecessors were his parents. See Appellant's Brief at p. 22.
This assertion is unsubstantiated by the record and is completely irrelevant to this appeal.
In addition, the Lances' testimony that Mr. Carlisle's testimony was "directly contradicted
by two disinterested witnesses of Defendant, Duane Smith and Frankie HouseP'and as
such cannot be "clear and convincing" is unsupported. It is a trial court's province to
weigh the conflicting evidence and decide whether it is clear and convincing. See
Pollesche v. TransAmerican Insurance Co., 497 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1972).
As further evidence that the testimony was not clear and convincing, the Lances
claim that the McNaughtens could not have parked their cars on the Lane because there
was no garage and the apartment wasn't built until 1985, meaning the McNaughtens and
Lunts would have parked on their own property. See Appellant's Brief p. 22. This
argument is irrelevant. It assumes that the McNaughtens parked their car where the
existing garage is and not on the Lane. This was not established and therefore is
irrelevant to this appeal. In a similar vein, the Lances argue that testimony of a fence
three to four feet from the edge of the McNaughten house demonstrates the McNaughtens
and Lunts accessed their property not by the Lane, but on their own property. Therefore,
evidence asserting otherwise cannot be "clear and convincing." See Appellant's brief at
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25-26. This too is an irrelevant argument. The trial court heard the testimony of use of
the Lane, saw exhibits of photographs of the Lane being used in its current location, and
weighed the evidence accordingly. In addition, the Lance's remaining arguments that
testimony showed other access to the property at one time and "defendant's witnesses
were at least as credible as Plaintiffs witnesses, and arguably more so" are equally
unsupported and irrelevant. The trial court is granted great discretion in those findings
and the weight of the evidence was in favor of Mr. Lunt. Contradictory testimony does
not preclude a trial court from making a finding of an easement that is clear and
convincing.
Both Judge Pullan and Judge Schofield addressed the Lances' argument that the
trial court was precluded from making a clear and convincing finding of an easement
because this finding was "directly contradicted" by the evidence presented by their
witnesses. Judge Schofield was more specific in addressing the Lances argument that
conflicting evidence precludes the clear and convincing standard from being met. After
citing to Judge Pullan's findings of fact and conclusion of law discussing the credibility
of Mr. Carlisle and the aforementioned quote, he stated:
That contradictory evidence was presented throughout the trial does not mean that
the evidence in favor of granting the prescriptive easement was not clear and
convincing. Every trial contains contradictory evidence. That is the nature of the
adversarial legal system. It is the primary responsibility of the trial judge to weigh
and judge the credibility of competing witness testimony and make decisions
thereon. Defendant's "sincere and compelling belief that the trial judge made an
incorrect ruling does not warrant a new trial.
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R. at 932. In addition, the argument that the testimony is self-serving is not demonstrated
by the record as the Lances contend. Mr. Carlisle, who the trial court found "particularly
credible" (R. at 728) has no interest in the property and the Lances can point to nothing
which demonstrates the testimony of Ms. Boren, Jack Lunt, and Garth Lunt was
completely self-serving.
III.

WHETHER THE COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT CURRENT USE OF THE EASEMENT WAS
CONSISTENT WITH HISTORIC USE.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the extent of any prescriptive easement is
"measured and limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period." McBride v.
McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). The Utah Supreme Court has also held that
"[T]he owner of the dominant estate may enjoy to the fullest extent the rights conferred
by his easement [as long as he does not] alter its character so as to further burden or
increase the restriction upon the servient estate." Id. The evidence clearly and
convincingly demonstrated that the Lane during the prescriptive period was used for
residential and agricultural purposes. These purposes for the Lane's use included
accessing the rear portion of both the Witt and McNaughten properties.
The evidence presented before the court indicated that during the prescriptive
period, the Witts, McNaughtens, and the Lunts used the Lane for both residential and
agricultural uses. The Plaintiffs witness testified both the Witts and the McNaughtens
used the Lane to access their respective acreage, drive cattle, move farm equipment, as
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well as using the Lane as a driveway. The trial court found this evidence to be clear and
convincing. Reflecting the testimony of the parties, the trial court found that both parties
"jointly used the Lane to access their acreage, run cattle, haul hay, move farm equipment,
and park cars as often as either found it necessary and convenient." R. at 728. This
finding by the trial court is supported by the testimony of witnesses for both sides.
Mr. Carlisle stated that in the 1920's and 1930's the Witts used the Lane for
vehicular traffic and parked their car on the Lane and later just south of the Lane when a
garage was built. R. 958 at 127:20-25. He also testified that the Lane was used for
driving cattle, and accessing the canal for swimming. R. 958 at 117-119. Evidence was
presented by Ms. Boren that the Lane was used for a driveway during the late 1940's. R.
958 at 64:7-17. Jack Lunt testified that at one point they took "a bob sleigh and wagons"
and other haying equipment down the Lane. R. 958 at 30:10-13. Garth Lunt testified that
the Lane or driveway had existed "forever, as far as I know" (R. 958 at 134:10-11), that
they used the Lane to take cattle and teams of horses up it and hay back to the barn and
machinery (R. 958 at 134-135), and that during the wintertime they would bring
machinery from the north fields and park it on the Lane (R. 958 at 135). He later testified
that from 1954 to the early 1990fs that he and the Witts used the Lane to haul hay to their
respective barns, move equipment up and down the Lane, move horses and cattle up and
down the Lane, and the county would use the Lane to access the property to spray thistles,
clean the canal and remove snow. R. 958 at 138.
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This case was brought before the trial court as Mr, I unt sought to continue U use
the I,ane to access the rear portion of his acreage, that can only be accessed by traversing
the I ,ane. I his use is consistent witl 1 till: le histoi ic 1 ise cit irii lg the prescripts e pei iod
-"

J: •^•lient and livestock were driven down the Lane

to the back of the McNaughten/Lunt propert)' , Today vehicles are still driven to the back
of the property. The type of vehicle used does not automatically lead to the conclusion

has increased on the servient estate.
The evidence presented is clear and convincing that the uses during the
prescriptive period were both agrui.;

:. .;.:.. r^iu-j::.

main i ise of tl le easen lent vv as to - - -

4X

portions olTh * : ^ w r t y . The trial ^ouu s

final order states "Plaintiff is entitled to use the easement as any party would normally use
a driveway." R. at 843. This use is exactly what the Lane was used i..- wistoricalh uiit;
iliiiiiif.: (In: pivsu'ipliw |VM<HI a dnwu.is n:w\l nt loi k-tli ^ILIJI^nllin\'il (Iarm afiitpinctit,
cattle, etc.) and residential (vehicles, walking) use. These rights of use have not '"enlarged
[or] place[d] a greater burden or servitude on the property" as alleged by the Lances.
AtCtsuii >. ^unJb'jrg. i . . . . .

/v.

cleili led ii i tl le ti ial coi irts fii lal order must be upheld.
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IV.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DETERMINING THE WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY OF THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED.

The correctness of the trial court's factual findings based on the witness testimony
will only be reversed if they are found to be "clearly erroneous." 438 Main Street v. Easy
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,149 (Utah 2004). The Utah Supreme Court has held that
"Evaluating conflicting testimony is the proper role of the finder of fact." Hogle v.
Zinetics Med., Inc., 2002 UT 121, \ 16 (Utah 2002). "When an appellant asserts that the
evidence is insufficient to support the lower court's findings of fact, 'we do not weigh the
evidence de novo.' Rather, we accord great deference to the lower court's findings,
'especially when they are based on an evaluation of conflicting live testimony.'" Id.
(quoting In re Estate o/Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). "Moreover, 'to mount a
successful challenge to the correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must
first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings even viewing it in light most
favorable to the court below.'" Id. (quoting Alta Indus. Limited v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,
1284 (Utah 1993). The Lances have failed to marshal all the evidence that supports the
trial court's findings. The testimony of the witnesses established, and the trial court
found, that the width of the Lane during the prescriptive period was 34-35 feet in width.
This was the testimony of both Jack and Garth Lunt. R. 958 at 42, 135-136. There is no
testimony to support the Lances assertion that the Lane was 10-12 feet in width. In
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addition to this testimony, the trial court was able to go to the property to inspect the Lane
visually. R. 958 ai 12Q--1 ~r>. In its findings of fact, the trial court stated that "the Lane
commences at 600 W est UIK; ... _w lea W U;„
1

.-.."- !••

. .•

/9.
*

^-e\ base this argument

on a statement made by Garth Lunt who said "there was about a 10 feet wire gate" (R.
958 at 186). Appellant's Brief at 6. This gate, the same 10-12 foot gate uiai jack * .nt

the Lane along 600 West. Rather, thi^ <jate ^ as part of the fence which ran alongside the
Lane. The gate was at the end of the Lane where it turned and allowed access from the
Lane to tiie i,uiii s rear acreage. '

_ loot gate was not set across .;. . a;;. .

argument ihai the use ui the Lane could onl) be 10-12 feel in ,\idth due to this gate.
While the issue of the final width of the I ,ane will be addressed in greater detai

.. ^e

cross-appeal, the I .ai ices' asser Lioi I tl lat tl le \ - idtl i of: It le I ai le si lould be lin lited to 10 12
feet is unsupported after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court.
" I 'he challenge b> the Lances as to the size Oi me easement has not sho \ v i I tl I ;,: trial
court's findings to be legally insufficient

See Bogle, 2002 I J I at 1] 16. Especially, when

those findings are viewed in the light most favorable to the court below. See Id.
Therefore, this Court should deny the I,ance's appeal.

CONCLUSION
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Appellee Garth Lunt requests
this Court to deny the Lances appeal in its entirety, and together with all further relief the
Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
CROSS-APPEAL OF GARTH LUNT
INTRODUCTION
The issues of abandonment and the limitation of a prescriptive easement are before
this Court on cross-appeal. The trial court ruled that the Lunts abandoned the 14 feet in
the width of their prescriptive easement and abandoned the prescriptive easement west of
the gate that ran across the Lane approximately 180 feet from the road. By so doing, Mr.
Lunt's prescriptive easement and his ability to access the rear acreage of the property was
severely limited.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred by ruling sua sponte on the issue of abandonment, an issue
that was not before the court. Even if the trial court had the authority to rule on the issue
of abandonment, it misapplied the doctrine of abandonment when it held as a matter of
law that Mr. Lunt intentionally abandoned portions of the prescriptive easement.
Mr. Lunt appeals the trial court's ruling on abandonment for two reasons. First,
the trial court reached beyond the scope of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c)(1) by
ruling on abandonment when it was not an issue raised or tried before the court. Second,

-30-

the Lances failed to prove abandonment by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence. In
addition, Mr. I iiiit also appeals the limitation of the width and length of the easement.
1 1 le limitation of the width to 20 feet is ii ICOI isistent \ dtl 1 e\ idence presented at trial ai id
llt'i" Ii iit! i oiirf s |Biii4ltii<_* of liu'l I'lial Ihe 1 nuc was 34 feet during the time the prescriptive
easement was created. Ihe trial court also limited the length of the easement to 180 feet
instead of the 235 feet that is supported by the record.
MIL Ithil 'Hiiiiiiii Ii uiim I m 11 h m n M i

1 iiiiiii liui>a piLMTipln c easement I I I iln, 1 ,ine I in

severely limited this easement with its sua sponte ruling on the issue of abandonment and
the limitation on the width and length of the easement. Therefore. M"

T

mt -equests this

Court to grant relief by reversing the trial court* s finding of abariu
Iimil.ilion i>I* 111r caseniL/iil h iiv.loriii;' Ihe length and \\ itl( 11 oil l!

!

^a^'iptive casement

in full.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR
BY RULING SUA SPONTE ON THE ISSUE OF ABANDONMENT
WHEN THIS ISSIIE WAS NOT RAISED OR TRIED BEFORE IT.
The i • ami the trial court entered judgment on a theory that was not raised by
the pleadings or tried before the court is a conclusion of law that is reviewed under the
correction of error standard. See Cc nvley v. Pi rrfer, 2005 i \;pj:) 518, """t 31 (1 J I >. ' \pp, 2005).
The !nu! vjini '/nrd !", imu\n\ic\ on ilir h^ic of abandonment because abandonment was
neither raised nor tried before the court by either party. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
54(c)(1) as interpreted by Utah case law bars trial courts from granting rei^i on issues
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that parties do not raise or try. Ut. R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1). While Rule 54(c)(1) permits
courts to grant relief on grounds not pleaded, "that rule does not go so far as to authorize
the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried." Combe v. Warren's Family
Drive-Inns Inc, 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984). It is error for a trial court to grant relief
on issues not raised or tried before it. Combe, 680 P.2d at 736 (citing Curran v. Mount,
657 P.2d 389 (Ala. 1980)). In reversing the Combe trial court's sua sponte ruling in that
case, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "It is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or
during trial and unsupported by the record." Id., citing Curran v. Mount, 657 P.2d 389
(Ala. 1980).
When trial courts make findings and determinations on matters outside of the
issues of the case presented, it is not only clear error, but such findings "will have no
force or effect." Id. (citing Brantley v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist, 587 P.2d 427 (N.M. 1978)).
Moreover, "in law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by the
pleadings, and a trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented
for determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity." Id. (citing
Estate ofHurlbutt, 585 P.2d 724 (Ore. 1978); Credit Investment and Loan Co. v.
Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 444 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1968)). Parties have the power to
choose the specific issues it raises before the court and a trial court cannot enter findings
on those issues parties choose not to raise. Id. The Combe court further clarified,
"[p]arties may limit the scope of litigation if they choose, and if an issue is clearly
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withheld, the court cannot nevertheless adjudicate it and grant corresponding relief." Id.
(citing Wineglass Ranches, Inc. v. Campell, 473 P.2d 496 (A, ^70)).
iiiv. \ tLi, •_ oin* * f Appeals Cian;iCvi t w-.;;/Jc n\ iVK^i:. i:::; ... .
•'

*

:

»:

'^ii::k'i cut notice of issues through

the pleadings. See Cowley v. Poncr, 2005 UT App 51 X (I :iaf u.Anp. 2005V The Court
of Appeals distinguished the appeal in Porter, where Porter appealed that the trial L,:U; /s
ruling was not based on claims raised in the coi i iplaint : i tri s :1 before the ecu irt, froi n
Combe. The ( "ouil ol" /Appeals in Porter held that courts can rule on issues so long as the
parties have sufficient notice of issues from the pleadings and are not adversely
prejudiced by the court ruling on those issues. 1 lie Court stated:
Rule 54(c)(1) requires trial courts to be liberal in awarding appropriate relief
justified by the facts developed at trial, as long as the failure to request a particular
form of relief does not prejudice a party in the preparation or trial of the case. If
there is no prejudice, it is necessan ouh thai the relief granted be supported by the
evidence and be a permissible form of relief lor the claims litigated.
CiJ\vufs at r j , \ ^iirn^ J ic.-;,ierson v, ho* nln> < \t
'

• ' II" ill In ' ll ' 1 * 'I. \pp l'>Ni I. In

ed that Porter not only had sufficient notice of the buyout

contract issues in Cowley's initial complaint, but Porter's own memorandum in
opposition to Cowley's motion for summary judgment addressed Hit: issue llul Ilk
existence and terms of \hr buyout agreenirnl w nv rontrsled. and arguments related to
whether a binding buyout agreement was reached were raised and litigated during the first
phase of the trial. Id., at Iffl 40-41.

Unlike Cowley, in this case the trial court's sua sponte abandonment ruling
prejudiced Lunt because it was not raised or tried before the trial court and Lunt was
unable to address the legal issues of abandonment, actual relinquishment of the Lane and
the intent to abandon. No where in the pleadings do the Lances raise the issue of
abandonment as a defense in their answer to the complaint or in answer to the amended
complaint. However, both the complaint and amended complaint alleged boundary by
acquiescence and prescriptive easement which were subsequently argued by both Parties
at trial.
During the actual trial phase of this case, the issue of abandonment was not raised
or tried before the court. In fact, the only place where abandonment was even raised at
the trial occurs at the last few pages of the trial transcript when the trial court briefly
discussed the issue with Lances' counsel during his closing arguments. The Lances'
counsel asserted that over time, because the Lunts used different access to their property
contemporaneous to the Lane at issue, they had no prescriptive easement in the Lane.
This prompted the court to ask counsel, "is it your position that the Lunts, if they did have
a prescriptive easement, abandoned it in favor of that other use or other access?" R. 959
at 357:21-23. Lances' counsel responded:
I wish I had a case to quote to you because I haven't looked at that particular issue,
but there is under Powell on real property a section, talks about abandonment, that
you can't abandon the - you can abandon the use. If that's the case I think it's
been abandoned, I think, for at least 20 years, because if we show '79 up to '99 it's
been 20 years since it's been abandoned. I don't know the answer to that. Of
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course, I could argue and say, "Well of course, Your Honor, of course it's been
abandoned.'*
R. 959 at 358:2-9 (emphasis added). Lances' counsel, however never raised the issue of
abandoi in lei it befoi e 01 after this excl lai lge. I -ai ices failed to i aise abandonn lent as a
defense to Lunt's claims for a boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement, and
never sought to establish the theory of abandonment during the questioning of witnesses
at trial.
I lit: I .1 in: it > < < as preji idiced b;; ' not being able tc • de^ elop an argument and present
evidence that the elements of abandonment had not been met. Testimony during trial was
not sought on actual abandonment or intent to abandon, legal issues which have to be
proven for a ;:numg of abai idol lment to be i i: lade. I ;\ Mil lern IC i : , "h In: , I i int v > as i inable to
properl\ respi MM) in llii-i issue because this exchange occurred during closing arguments
and the issue was not raised or tried prior to this exchange. The Lances were not •
concerned with abandonment. Their belief maintained from opening argun .:
soundii lg of it le closing bell • v as tl: lat I li I -\ n it • :>c -\ il :i not pi odi ice clear and convincing
evidence of a boundary by acquiescence or a prescriptive easement. ;-u-v R. 959 at
358:14-21

Because abandonment was not raised or tried, the court erred in ruling sua

sponte on the issue,
i !-o limitation on the easement due to the trial courts ruling on abandonment is not
"supported by the evidence [or] a permissible form of relief for the claims litigated"
because abandonment was never raised or t nee; CLIOW ,IK I. ... ...
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The trial court found in its conclusions of law that a prescriptive easement existed on the
full length of the Lane. Judge Pullan wrote:
In the instant case, from the 1930's and continuing through at least the mid-1970fs,
the McNaughtens have continuously used the Lane to transport cattle, haul hay,
move agricultural equipment, and park cars. During this time, each family relied
on the Lane to access the rear of their respective acreage. The Court concludes
that the Plaintiff proved these elements by clear and convincing evidence.
R. 729. However, the court then found, without the legal question being raised or tried,
that a portions of the length and width of the prescriptive easement was abandoned by
Lunt. R. 727. By addressing this issue sua sponte, the trial court acted beyond the scope
of Rule 54(c)(1). Therefore, Lunt respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial
court's ruling on abandonment and restore the prescriptive easement in whole in
accordance with the trial court's finding of law.
II.

IF THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN RULING ON
ABANDONMENT, IT STILL ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF
THE DOCTRINE OF ABANDONMENT TO THIS CASE.

In the alternative, even if this Court finds that the trial court was justified to rule
sua sponte on the issue of abandonment, the standard of proof for abandonment was not
met and the doctrine of abandonment was misapplied to this case. The finding by the trial
court is in error and contrary to law as the evidence does not support a finding of Mr.
Lunt's intent to abandon the easement. In Utah, "it is well-recognized that an easement
or right of way may be abandoned." Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d
181, 182 (Utah 1977). However, the party asserting abandonment has to meet a high
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standard to prove abandonment. A mere preponderance of the evidence is insufficient to
show actual intent to abandon one's right in a prescriptive easement. Western Gateway,
567 P.2d at 182 (citing Harmon v. Rasmiissen, 375 P.2d 763,, 765 (I Jtah 1962) ("Pr< )()f of
abandoi n :t lent of si id I an easement reqi lires action releasing o vvi lership tl: le right to i ise
with clear and convincing proof of intentional abandonment."). Instead, a party seeking
to nullify another's easement or property interest on the ground- of abandonment must
establish such abandonment by "clear, unequivocal, ..,;., j ^ v : - \ J O idem c.
Ryn/utrl. 200", I r| K-I «| I 1 (I i|,ili MIOS Mrifiir / ht\n>mhv

(hodvear

' ' w / r i.

Tire & Rubber, 199

l ; .2d 43 i, H 5 5 (8th Cir. 1952)); see also Lucky Seven Rodeo (\>rj\ v cL< r k, ^55 P.2d "50.
753 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). This standard of proof is at least a standard of proof as ingn as

; \'\w- \dJinuiun

v. Lexus, 441 U.S. 418, 432 {IV~9)).

Therefore, a "'clear, unequivocal

and decisive" showing of abandonment can o n h be met where (lie "acts of the owner
clearly show that such was his purpose.' J utile v. Sowaclski.

1 lu V, M^9. 9 ( o (I itah

19712),,,
In addition, the doctrine of abandonment is uniform in all states, including Man. in
that non-use of a prescriptive easement alone, regardless of the length o f t h e period o:
non-use., is Ii lsufficiei it to pi o v e abandoi n nent See Western Gatewcn >, 567 P 2d at 182
Rather, a prescriptive easement is only considered abandoned when the dominant estate
holder demonstrates an actual intent to abandon, it. Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App. 278
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Tf 16 fn 6 (Utah Ct.App. 1999). Therefore, the primary elements of abandonment are
actual relinquishment and intent to abandon, or in other words, "the intention to abandon
and the external act by which that intention is carried into effect." Botkin v. Kickapoo,
Inc., 505 P.2d 749, 752 (Kan. 1973); see also Harmon v. Rasrnussen, 375 P.2d 762, 76466 (Utah 1962) (stating that overt act is needed to prove intent to abandon and proof of
abandonment requires action releasing ownership and right to use with clear and
convincing proof of intentional abandonment). While Utah case law does not explicitly
state an "affirmative act" is needed, the requirement for an "overt act" is similar to some
states' requirement that an affirmative act is needed to prove abandonment. See e.g.
Sabados v. Kiraly, 393 A.2d 486 (Pa.Super. 1978) (Abandonment requires a showing that
a party intended to abandon and give up permanently his right to use an easement. Such
conduct must consist of some affirmative act which renders use of the easement
impossible, or of some physical obstruction of it in a manner that is inconsistent with its
further use.)
In this case, the evidence failed to meet the strict standard of proof that there was
both actual relinquishment of the easement and an intent to abandon the easement. As
such, the trial court did not correctly apply the law of abandonment to this case.
A.

The Lane Was Never Actually Abandoned And Use of the Lane,
Compatible With Its Historical Uses, Has Continued to the Present.

The abandonment standard is met when clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence
demonstrates the prescriptive easement was actually relinquished and abandoned. The
-38-

burden is on the person asserting abandonment to prove it. Provo River Water Users
Ass'n v. Lambert,

642 P.2d 12 i 9, 1221 (Utah 1982). One way to prove actual

relinquishment or abandonment of an easement is foi the party asserting abai ldonmei it to
pi odi ice :leai i it le qi ii < /ocal, at id decisive evidei ice tl lat i ise of the easement has changed
and its current use is for "an entirely different purpose which is incompatible with the
original purpose for which the easement was created." Brown v. Oregon Short Line • R.

] hr si:mii:ird for abandonment is also met where the evidence presented at trial is
clear, unequivocal, and decisive that adverse use b\ the owner of the ser lent estate is
acquiesced in b>r the owner ol ,n^ juniinant estate for a ^erfo; ^i'limc »• iik-^
e LaO.: •

;' .

'

" : \.'^

. .

.

:

;\

-/ y.

PiuOW,

541 S.L. 2d 550, 560 ^Vd. 2uulj.
In Brown. clear, uikv .^ ocau and decisive evidence demonstrated that an
easemen, i^: (lie purposes of ingress/egress to a i esidential i I : igl lborhood w as actually
aband • •• l ^

n iilnuT produced at trial was clear, unequivocal, and decisive that the

residences formerly the reason for the ingress/egress were torn down and the land was
used to construct and operate a permanent railroad, switch, spur and oilier tracks.
Therefore it v -as impossible 1 o \ ise tl le easemei it foi its original pi irpose of ingress/egress
to residences. Id. Because the new use was incompatible with the original easement,
there was actual abandonment of the easement.
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Hudson v. Pillow is an example of a servient estate retaking a prescriptive
easement by open, notorious, and adverse use for twenty years. In Hudson, the party
asserting abandonment was able to produce evidence that while another party held a
prescriptive easement, the servient estate holder placed gates over the road and only
allowed individuals to use the road with their permission. The servient estate granted this
required permission for use for more than twenty years. Therefore, the court was justified
in finding that non-use of the easement coupled with the open, notorious, and adverse acts
of the servient owners for a period sufficient to create a prescriptive right, was clear,
unequivocal, and decisive proof of actual relinquishment and abandonment.
In this case, there was no actual relinquishment or abandonment of the easement.
While the findings of fact indicate that agricultural use of the rear portion of the Lane
west of the gate has dwindled and there is currently a gate across the Lane, these facts do
not prove actual relinquishment of the Lane west of the gate. Unlike Brown, the use of
the Lane has not changed such that it is incompatible with its original use. In fact, the
Lane west of the gate is accessible for use completely compatible with its original
purpose, which the evidence presented at trial, includes using the Lane for "access [to]
the rear of their respective acreage." R. 728.
In addition, the record does not support a Hudson-like retaking of the easement by
open, notorious and adverse use by the servient estate (the Whitts/Lances). In fact, the
record demonstrates otherwise, that neither the servient or dominant estate holders asked
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permission of each other to use the Lane. The testimony at trial reflects that the Witts and
the McNaughtens used the Lane to accesss their acreage, move farm equipment and
livestock, and to park cars. .vc e.g. K. ^f.v .
inlliiiy 'i»l iihaiulniinicni Ihciv is no disnission ofactual abandonment by either change of
use incompatible with the historical use or adverse possession by the servient estate.
While the trial court's abandonment ruling does state that a gate blocking the Lane was
const:,; ....
w hat p i u pose the gate was installed, whether the servient estate was asserting a right or
simply placing a gate over the Lane, and whether the gate restricted Mr. I lint's access.
Furthermore, the record does demonstrate that permission wa ;:rai.;v
dominant cstalc Inns" ll

/ I" aav \s •-

-•

-o;.-.

:<

s

'. K. 752ffl[52-53. I his

supports the conclusion that the ability to use the Lane w as never relinquished or
abandoned. Accordingly, there was no actual abandonment of the I,ane west o; UIL gale.
The Clear, Unequivocal, and Decisive Stand. i ml \y sis Not Met Itemiise
Iiiint Did Not Intend to Abandon the Lane.
It is difficult to establish clear, unequivocal, and decisive proof of intent to
abandon. In Utah, an overt act proving intent to abandon, coupled with non-use or actual
abandonment ia icqum il (o pruu1 abandonment h* i llrai iiiir-i|iiis i i al unci ilaashe
evidence. See Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 764 {Liuii 19o2;. iio\\e\er, ""ihe
holder of an easement does not forfeit a pari of it because he V:s no present need for it ~~
because he is unlikely to exercise the whole of
/<//- : :r ru ..•/;. . \

A.2d 862, 864 (N.H. 1985). It is well-established previously that non-use alone is
insufficient to prove abandonment. Even extended non-use "is not of itself an
abandonment of it, but, at most, in connection with other facts, may be evidence of an
intention to abandon or of actual abandonment. Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 102
P. 740, 742 (Utah 1909) (emphasis added).
Utah courts have determined that non-use of an easement coupled with a fence
across it and the way covered with undergrowth and debris is insufficient to prove intent
to abandon. Western Gateway Storage v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977).
Filling dirt around a headgate to prevent its use, coupled with several years of actual nonuse of the easement to move water is also insufficient to prove intent to abandon.
Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 765 (Utah 1962).
In other states, courts have found that evidence of non-use coupled with an
easement holder allowing a fence to block access to portions of an easement or acquiesce
in the easement being overgrown with small and large trees, thus blocking use of the
Lane, is insufficient to demonstrate an actual intent to abandon. See Chickamanga
Properties, Inc. v. Barnard, 853 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. 2006); Strahin v. Lantz, 456 S.E.2d 12
(W.Va. 1995); Downing House Realty v. Hampe, 497 A.2d 862 (N.H. 1985).
The record fails to support any evidence that Mr. Lunt actually intended to
abandon his easement. Furthermore, the Lances failed to raise the issue of intent to
abandon, therefore making it impossible to prove intent to abandon by clear, unequivocal,
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and decisive evidence. While the record indicates there may have been periods of nonuse on Mr. Lunt's easement west of the gate of the prescriptive easement, the record fails
provide any overt act in connection with non-use that could be considered evidence of an
intention to abandon the prescriptive easement. See Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762,
764 (Utah 1962). As previously discussed, the record shows that the issue of
abandonment was not raised at all during trial. Opposing counsel did not ask any of the
witnesses questions regarding non-use, who put the gate across the Lane, whether any
parties contested the gate installation, or whether the Lane was used after the gate was
placed across the Lane. Lance also failed to explore this issue during pre-trial
proceedings.
C.

The Trial Court's Finding of Abandonment is Clear Error Because An
Implied Intent to Abandon Does Not Meet the Clear, Unequivocal, and
Decisive Standard Necessary to Prove Abandonment.

Implication of intent to abandon is not clear, unequivocal, or decisive proof of
abandonment or intent thereof. While the statement in the court's ruling originating in 25
Am. Jur. 2d § 112 stating "an easement is considered abandoned when there is a history
of non-use coupled with an act or omission showing clear intent to abandon" is wellfounded, it is not dispositive that mere implied acquiescence in a gate being placed across
a Lane is clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence of an intent to abandon. See R. 726.3
3

"In the instant case, the gate blocking the Lane was constructed in the early
1980 s. From that date, Plaintiff ceased to use the Lane west of the gate. For more than 20
years, Plaintiff has acquiesced in the closure, never taking any action to object. This
history of non-use and inaction show a clear intent on the part of Plaintiff to abandon the
?

-43-

Neither Utah law nor cases from other jurisdictions support the conclusion that
mere acquiescence in placing a "gate" across a Lane coupled with non-use is sufficient to
prove intent to abandon. See Western Gateway Storage v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182
(Utah 1977); see also Chickamanga Properties, Inc. v. Barnard, 853 N.E.2d 148 (Ind.
2006); Strahin v. Lantz, 456 S.E.2d 12 (W.Va. 1995); Downing House Realty v. Hampe,
497 A.2d 862 (N.H. 1985). Instead, the law requires that there must be some factual
finding that demonstrates Lunt acquiesced because he intended to abandon the Lane.
While the findings of fact only indicate that the gate was constructed across the Lane in
the early 1980's and was moved forward at one period of time. There is no testimony or
factual findings informing who installed the gate, why access to the Lane west of the gate
was discontinued, whether Lunt intended to give up use of the Lane, or whether he simply
currently had no present need to use the gate.
To the contrary, a gate across the Lane did not give Mr. Lunt any indication that he
could not use the Lane if he so desired. The evidence clearly and convincingly supported
the trial court's conclusion of law that "neither the Witts nor the McNaughtens ever asked
permission of the other to use the Lane." Instead, both parties used the Lane for
agricultural and residential purposes as often as they found convenient. There is no
evidence in the record that the gate was intended to block Mr. Lunt's use of the Lane west

Lane west of the gate.
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of the gate. He could have used the rear portion of Lane west of the gate at any time if he
so desired.
This is similar to a previously referenced case from New Hampshire, in which a
fence was erected over a portion of an easement and remained in place for approximately
thirty years. In addition to extended non-use of the easement and the fence across the
easement, large trees also grew over the easement. Despite this, the court found the
evidence insufficient to establish abandonment because of the lack of permanency of the
non-use. The court held "had the owner of the easement chosen to exercise control of the
land, the fence and trees could easily have been removed at any time." Downing House
Realty v. Hampe, 497 A.2d 862, 864 (N.H. 1985). Likewise, had Mr. Lunt chosen to
exercise control over his easement, the Lane was still accessible for use as it had been in
the past.
However, neither the issue of abandonment nor the issue of whether Lunt
acquiesced in the closure were explored by either party during the trial - thus there was
no notice that this was an issue before the court. The issue of abandonment was raised
only by the court during closing arguments for the defense. The question of whether the
Lunts acted to oppose the gate, or even if the gate prevented them from accessing the
western portion of the Lane was not even discussed by the parties at any time during these
proceedings. Therefore, there can be no "clear, unequivocal, and decisive showing" of
intent to abandon. State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84 ]f 14 (Utah 2005).
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Similar to cases from Utah and many other jurisdictions, the record in this case
fails to support a finding that the evidence before the trial court of both actual
relinquishment and intent to abandon was clear, unequivocal and decisive.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY LIMITING THE EASEMENT TO
20 FEET IN WIDTH AND 183 FEET IN LENGTH.

The trial court erred in limiting Mr. Lunt's prescriptive easement to 20 feet in
width and 183 feet in length when its findings of facts expressly stated the Lane was 34
feet in width and its conclusions of law found the prescriptive easement was for the entire
length of the Lane. The measure and limit of this prescriptive easement is determined by
the use made of the Lane during the prescriptive period from the late 1920's to the
present. See McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978) ( "It has long been the
law of this jurisdiction, and elsewhere that the extent of an easement acquired by
prescription is measured and limited by the use made during the prescriptive period.");
see also Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates HO A, 2004 UT App. 149, ^ 14 (Utah Ct.App.
2004) (the court looked to prior use of easement to determine current scope.) In addition,
courts are forbidden from limiting an easement based on equity and must strictly enforce
the well-established law that the measure and limit of an easement is the use made of it
during the prescriptive period. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct.App. 1993).
In this case, the trial court held that the Lane during the prescriptive period was 34 feet in
width and extended to the end of the Lane. R. 728. However, witness testimony stated
that the length of the easement was between 235-247 feet in length. See R. 735, 737.
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Therefore, the court's order limiting the scope of the easement to 20 feet in width and 180
feet in length must be overturned and returned to 34 feet in width and no less that 235 feet
in length.
The trial court found that an easement was created in the Lane, that the Lane was
34 feet in width, and its use extended from the road to the back of the properties, which
several witnesses testified was at least 235 feet in length. This, therefore, is the measure
and limit of the easement. Other than abandonment, the only explanation for the trial
court's limitation on the width and length of the Lane is that the limitation is based in
equity. Utah courts have held that a trial court cannot limit a prescriptive easement based
on equity. Id.
The trial court in this case limited the historical use of Lunt's prescriptive
easement to 20 feet in width and 183 feet in length based on equity. In finding that Mr.
Lunt has a prescriptive easement over the Lances property, the court indicated the
measure and limit of the use of the easement. "From the 1930's and continuing through at
least the mid-1970s, the McNaughtens have continuously used the Lane to transport
cattle, haul hay, move agricultural equipment, and park cars. During this time, each
family relied on the Lane to access the rear of their respective acreage." R. 729. The
court concludes that the Plaintiff proved these elements by clear and convincing
evidence." Id. This language makes clear that the Lane, all 34 feet in width, and
extending from the road to the rear portions of the property, was acquired by prescriptive
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easement. Therefore, the trial court erred when it limited the scope of the easement to 20
feet in width extending only to the gate across the easement.
In a post-trial hearing to address concerns arising out of preparing the order,
Lunt's counsel raised the issue of the limitation of the easement in preparing the order.
He stated to the trial court that the width of the easement was not disputed at trial, nor
was abandonment of the width of the Lane discussed at trial, and therefore the origin of
the 20 foot limitation of the easement was unclear. See R. 960 at 3-4. The trial court
responded:
It was my intent when I issued that decision that the width of the easement was at
one period of time the broader width, but that it had been abandoned, and what
was - what remained was a 20-foot width for the purposes of a driveway is
essentially what they had used it for in the mid '80's.
Id. at 3. This is inconsistent with comments later in the hearing and findings of fact in the
ruling. At the hearing, the court stated that "driveways are used for a host of reasons"
including livestock and utility easements. Id. at 8:12-16. In addition, the trial court's
findings of fact in the ruling indicate that the width of the Lane was never in dispute, only
the length thereof:
Between these two properties is the Lane which gives rise to this dispute. The land
commences at 600 West and is 34 feet wide. The Lane runs west between the
properties. The length of the Lane is in dispute.
R. 739.
The trial court found that Mr. Lunt holds a prescriptive easement, 34 feet in width
and extending from the road to the rear of the property, approximately 235-247 feet. The
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trial court erred when it limited the easement created during the prescriptive period as
described by McBride. Therefore, Lunt requests that the scope of the easement be
returned to its original form, which is 34 feet in width and not less that 235 feet in length.
CONCLUSION
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Cross-Appellant Garth Lunt
requests this Court to reverse the judgment of the court below in regards to the issue of
abandonment and to issue an order finding the easement to be at least 235 feet in length
by 34 feet in width as supported by the record, and together with all further relief the
Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
Dated this \ ^

day of July, 2007.
BOSTWICK & PRICE P.C.

Randy*}. Birch
Corey S. Zachman
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEFS OF
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT MR. GARTH LUNT to be sent by United
States Mail, postage prepaid, on this

'O

day of July, 2007, as follows:

Kraig J. Powell, Esq.
Shawn W. Potter, Esq.
TESCH LAW OFFICES PC

314 Main Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060
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Tab A

Judge PuUen's
Ruling

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GARTH LUNT, trustee of the GARTH 0.
LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST,

<JM>

RULING

Plaintiff,
Case No. 020500612
v.
Judge Derek P. Pullan

HAROLD LANCE and DIANE LANCE, and
Does 1-10,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for bench trial on November 1-2, 2005. The Plaintiff
was represented by attorneys Mr. Randy B. Birch and Mr. Jason Hadley. The Defendants were
represented by attorney Mr. Chris D. Greenwood.
The parties claim conflicting interests in a lane between their adjoining properties.
Plaintiff asserts claims for boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement. After careful
consideration of the testimony and evidence presented, the Court now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
General Description of
The Adjoining Parcels and The Disputed Lane
1.

Plaintiff owns property located at 205 North 600 West. The parcel is located on the west
side of 600 West. The home on the lot faces 600 West.

2.

Plaintiff is the successor in interest to Lincoln McNaughten (uMr. McNaughten"), and his

1

family. Mr. McNaughten was the step-father of Jack Lunt, Moneves Boren, and Garth
Lunt (trustee of the Plaintiff Trust).
3.

Defendants own the parcel of property immediately south of the Plaintiffs property.
They acquired it in August 1991.

4.

Defendants are successors in interest to the Frank Witt and his family.

5.

Between these two properties is the lane which gives rise to this dispute. The lane
commences at 600 West and is 34 feet wide. The lane runs west between the properties.
The length of the lane is in dispute.

6.

Running along the south side of the lane is a wooden fence ("the wooden fence"), which
has been overgrown by trees. Commencing at 600 West, the wooden fence runs west for
approximately 175 feet where it terminates at a gate ("the gate") crossing the lane.
Backing to the wooden fence are outbuildings located on the Witt property.

7.

Commencing near 600 West and running west, the north side of the lane is bordered by
(1) the south wall of the home on Plaintiffs property; (2) a large willow tree; and (3) a
fence (the old Witt fence) which runs for a substantial distance through open fields to a
canal. The old Witt Fence commences at the north end of the gate which crosses the lane.

8.

The lane appears on aerial photographs in 1946, 1962, 1978, 1979, 1985, 1993, 1997, and
2001.
Use and Condition of the Lane
Latel920's

9.

Eldon Carlisle was born in 1917 and is 88 years old. Except for his military service
which occurred between 1941 and 1946, he has lived in Heber City his entire life.
2

10.

In the late 1920's, Mr. Carlisle recalls the Witts owning an automobile. The Witts parked
the car in a garage which backed against the south side of the lane. The garage was
accessed by way of the lane.
1930 through 1950

11.

Mr. Carlisle was a childhood friend of Mr. McNaughten. As a boy in the 1930's he
helped the McNaugtens run cows down the lane.

12.

At that time, the lane continued beyond the gate which exists today. At the far west end
of the lane, there was a gate in the old Witt fence ("the far west gate"). Through the far
west gate, the McNaughtens would access their pasture and barn to the north.

13.

At that time, the old Witt fence ran east along the north side of the lane all the way to 600
West.

14.

After returning from his military service in 1946, Mr. Carlisle observed the McNaughtens
run cows down the lane just as they had done before. Mr. Carlisle recalls seeing the
McNaughtens using the lane in this way in the 1950fs.

15.

Mr. Carlisle testified that neither the Witts nor the McNaughtens ever objected to use of
the lane by the other.

16.

Mr. Duane C. Smith is 73 years old and has lived in Heber City his entire life. As early
as 1938, when he was 8 years of age, Mr. Smith drove cattle for the McNaughtens. Mr.
Smith never took the McNaughtens' cows down the lane.

17.

From 1930 and continuing into the 1940's, Mr. Smith saw stackers, bull-rakes, and other
farm equipment belonging to the Witts stored on the lane. At this time, the lane was
fenced on both sides. On the south side of the lane, the wooden fence ran 150 to 200 feet
3

where it terminated at the Witt's barn. On the north side of the lane, the old Witt Fence
ran all the way to 600 West.
18.

Between 1945 and 1950, Mr. Smith worked for the McNaugtens harvesting hay and
driving cows. During this time, he was at the McNaughten property at least two times per
day and only observed the Witts using the lane. He drove the McNaughten cattle through
a wire gate stretched between two willow trees approximately 150 feet north of the lane.
He did not use the lane to drive the cattle onto the McNaughten property.

19.

Between 1945 and 1947, Mr. McNaughten constructed a "basement home" on his
property. The lane ran east and west along the south wall of this house. The old Witt
fence was partially removed to accommodate the home. The old Witt fence ran almost to
the southwest corner of the home. There a small gate was maintained. It was only wide
enough for a person to walk through. It permitted access to the McNaughten property
from the lane.

20.

Between 1948 and 1949, Ms. Boren moved in with her mother and her father, Mr.
McNaughten. During this time she helped with the McNaughtens' milk cows. She
observed both the Witts and the McNaughtens park cars in the lane. Both families used
the lane to transport hay and to move dairy cows to their respective barns.

21.

Ms. Boren testified that the lane continued west beyond the gate that exists today. At the
end of the lane, the McNaughtens used the far west gate in the old Witt fence to access
the McNaughten barn. Ms. Boren testified that from 600 West to the terminus of the
lane, was 235 feet.

22.

Between 1945 and 1950, Ms. Frankie Witt Housel lived with her grandparents, Frank and
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Maud Witt on the Witt property.
23.

She testified that the purpose of the wooden fence was to enclose the Witt home.
According to Ms. Housel, the wooden fence commenced at 600 West and ran west to the
corner of the first outbuilding (a tool shed) where it terminated.

24.

According to Ms. Housel, her grandfather was "definite about protecting the lane." She
never saw the McNaughtens run cows, wagons, or farm equipment on the lane. She
walked the old Witt fence regularly on her way to go swimming in the canal. Ms. Housel
testified that there was no far west gate in the old Witt fence permitting access to the
McNaughten barn.

25.

The 1946 aerial photograph clearly shows the lane running west from 600 West for some
distance. Thereafter, it is obscured by trees.
1950 through 1965

26.

From 1950 to 1955, Ms. Boren (who had moved to Wallsburg) continued to assist her
parents milking and driving the cows and harvesting hay. During this time, she observed
both the Witts and the McNaughtens park cars in the lane. Both families used the lane to
transport hay to the barn and to move cows as described above. According to Ms. Boren,
the lane was the only available access to the McNaughten barn.

27.

Ms. Boren never observed Mr. McNaughten or Mr. Witt argue about or ask permission of
each other to use the lane.

28.

From 1950 to 1957, Ms. Housel continued to reside with her grandparents, the Witts. She
never observed the McNaughtens use the lane for any purpose and maintains that her
Grandfather did not approve of their doing so.
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29.

For some period of time between 1951 and the early 1960's, Jack Lunt lived at the
McNaughten house. He ran cattle and helped cut and haul hay. During this period of
time, he and others drove cows over the lane, as well as wagons, a bobsleigh, and farm
machinery.

30.

According to Jack Lunt, neither the McNaughtens nor the Witts ever asked permission of
the other to use the lane, they "just used it."

31.

Jack Lunt testified that during this time the lane continued west past the gate that exists
today. It was fenced on both sides. The lane terminated some 62 feet west of the gate at
the Witt barn. At the terminus, the McNaughtens would turn their cows to the north
through the far west gate to access the McNaughten pasture and barn. The McNaughtens
never used any land west of the Witt Barn.

32.

Jack Lunt testified that the total length of the common lane from 600 West to its terminus
was 247 feet.

33.

After being released from military service in 1954, Garth Lunt joined his brother at the
McNaugten home. Between 1954 and 1957, he helped haul hay and run cattle from the
north fields. He too observed the lane being used by both the McNaugtens and Witts to
haul hay, store equipment, and run cattle.

34.

Garth Lunt testified that the lane continued west beyond the gate that exists today. The
lane terminated at the Witt Barn, where the far west gate was used to access the
McNaughten pasture and barn. From 600 West to the terminus of the lane was 247 feet.

35.

Garth Lunt testified that both the McNaughten barn and the Witt barn were constructed
after 1946.
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36.

Garth Lunt testified that the McNaughtens maintained the lane by periodically filling
holes with gravel. He did not say when or how often this maintenance occurred.

37.

Garth Lunt testified that occasionally county employees used the lane to access areas
where thistles needed to be sprayed.

38.

According to Garth Lunt, the McNaughtens and the Witts never asked permission of each
other to use the lane. Rather, the families considered the lane mutual property. Likewise,
the Plaintiff has never asked permission of any successor in interest to the Witts
(including the Lances) to use the lane.

39.

In 1957, Garth Lunt moved to California and has resided there ever since.

40.

In the early 1960fs, the McNaughtens sold their grazing permit to Ott Sweat. At this time,
the McNaughten's range cattle enterprise ceased, but the dairy operation continued. After
the permit was sold, Jack Lunt obtained employment as a coal miner. Thereafter, he
returned to the property periodically; however, his visits were sporadic.

41.

A photograph taken some time between 1962 and 1965 was received into evidence. It
shows Mr. McNaughten's 1962 pickup parked in the lane adjacent to his home.

42.

The 1962 aerial photograph clearly shows the lane running west from 600 West past the
McNaughten residence for some distance. The lane is then obscured by trees, but
reappears and continues past the Witt Barn. The McNaughten barn is also visible. Mr.
Maurice Pia, the Defendant's expert photogrammetrist, could not ascertain with certainty
the existence of any other access to the McNaughten barn.
1965 through 1985

43.

The evidence as to use of the lane during this period of time is limited.
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44.

According to Ms. Boren, the McNaughtens continued to have cows and other animals on
their property and used the lane for these purposes. However, the scope of these activities
appears to have been in decline.

45.

Jack and Garth Lunt occasionally visited the property during this period, but have limited
knowledge of the use of the lane.

46.

In 1980, Mr. McNaughten died. Some animals were maintained on the property after his
death, but Ms. McNaughten's health was failing. Ms. Boren moved into the family home
to care for her mother who died in 1984.

47.

The 1978 and 1979 aerial photographs show the lane. However, some vegetation is
growing on the south side of the McNaughten home. The Witt barn is gone. In the 1979
photograph, some kind of shrubbery and vegetation appear on the south wall of the
McNaugten home.

48.

The 1979 aerial photograph shows a large access road to the McNaughten property. Mr.
Pia testified that the photograph depicted regular use of this road. The road commences
at a point approximately 150 feet north of the lane. It runs west from 600 West, then cuts
southwest to the McNaughten barn.

49.

The 1985 aerial photograph depicts this same access to the McNaughten barn and
vehicles parked past the barn. The lane is visible. It runs west from 600 West for a
distance only to again be obscured by trees. Vegetation is visible on the south side of the
McNaughten house. Shrubbery and vegetation on the south side of the McNaughten
home persist.
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1985 to Present
50.

In the early 1980's, the gate was constructed across the lane.

51.

Sometime between 1986 and 1988, the Plaintiff began leasing the McNaughten home and
an accessory apartment to tenants. From that time until the present, tenants leasing the
property have used the lane to access the back apartment.

52.

One of these tenants was Robert Williams. Ms. Boren testified that Mr. Williams used
the common lane to move his horses.

53.

Sometime after 1984, Ms. Boren gave permission to her grandson Trent Boren to use the
lane to access the back pasture land. Other tenants of the property were not given
permission to do so.

54.

In 1991, the McNaughten barn was sold and removed from the premises.

55.

The Defendants purchased the Witt parcel in 1991.

56.

In 1996, the Lances first informed Garth Lunt that they believed they were the owners of
the common lane.

57.

In 1999, Ms. Boren obtained a survey from Lord Engineering, and the Defendants
obtained a survey from Thompson-Hysell Engineers. The surveys conflict as to the
boundary line between the two properties.

58.

Sometime in the late 1990's, the Defendants deposited large piles of fill dirt on the lane,
partially blocking it. About the same time, Ms. Boren permitted her son to deposit large
landscaping rocks on part of the lane.

59.

Early in 2001, the Lances notified the Plaintiff that vehicles were not to be parked on the
lane.

9

60.

In the 1993 aerial photograph, the lane is markedly less visible. Vegetation can be seen
on the south side of the McNaughten home. What can be seen of the lane runs from 600
West to the rear of the home. The lane is then obscured by trees and does not reappear
west of those trees. The large access road to the north of the McNaughten home is readily
apparent.

61.

The 1997 and 2001 aerial photographs are generally consistent with the 1993 photograph.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Boundary by Acquiescence
To prove boundary by acquiescence, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence four elements: "(1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or
buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as the boundary, (3) for a long period of time, and
(4) by adjoining property owners." RHN Corp. v. VeibelL 2004 UT 60, f22 (2004), quoting,
Jacobs v. Hafem 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996).
Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "occupation" of the lane
up to a visible line. From the 1930's through 1945, the old Witt fence marked the northern
boundary of lane from 600 West to the far west gate. A part of the old Witt fence was removed
to accommodate construction of the McNaughten home in 1945, but that fence together with the
south wall of that home continued to mark the northern boundary of the lane until the late 1970's.
The southern boundary of the lane has been marked by the wood fence, and various outbuildings
on the Witt property from the 1930's to the present. From the 1930's through 1960, the wooden
fence continued beyond the gate to the McNaughten barn, further extending the southern
boundary of the lane.
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Beginning in the 1930's and continuing through at least the mid 1970's, both the
McNaughtens and the Witts used the lane to access their respective barns. However, this joint
use does not amount to "occupation" by either party for purposes of boundary by acquiescence.
Under that doctrine, "property rights are determined by actual possession of land." Gillmor v.
Cummings. 904 P.2d 703, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), citing, Carter v. Hanrath. 885 P.2d 801, 804
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, neither the McNaughten nor the Witt family possessed the
lane to the exclusion of the other. Rather, both families desired that the lane be unobstructed so
that it could be jointly used for agricultural purposes. On these facts, the Court cannot conclude
by a preponderance of the evidence that either family occupied the lane up to a visible line.
Plaintiff has also failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties
mutually acquiesced in a particular line separating the properties. "To acquiesce means to
'recognize and treat an observable line, such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the owner's
property from the adjacent landowner's property." RHN Corp., 2004 UT 60, ^[24, 96 P.3d 935,
citing Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, |18, 44 P.3d 781. "Acquiescence, or recognition, may be
tacit and inferred evidence." Ault, 2004 UT 60, ^[18. Acquiescence may be shown by
"occupation up to, but never over" a visible line, as well as by silence or the failure of a party to
object to a line as a boundary." RHN Corp.. 2004 UT 60, |25.
In the instant case, the Witts never acquiesced in the wood fence as the northern boundary
of their property. Likewise, the McNaughtens never acquiesced in the old Witt fence as the
southern boundary of their property. Rather, both families occupied the lane over these
purported boundary lines. Both families routinely used the entire lane between the fences for
agricultural purposes, as if the lane belonged to them. Neither family recognized either fence as
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a boundary between their respective properties.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs claim for boundary by acquiescence fails.
Prescriptive Easement
"A prescriptive easement is created when the party claiming the prescriptive easement
can prove that 'use of another's land was open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for
a period of twenty years.'" Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998), quoting, Valcarce
v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998). These elements must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing,
Garmond v. Kinney, 91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178 (1978). Whether an easement exists is a
question of law. Orton, 920 P.2d at 1256. However, "such a finding is the type of highly factdependent question, with numerous potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge broad
discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the given set of facts." Id.
In the instant case, from the 1930's and continuing through at least the mid-1970's, the
McNaughtens have continuously used the lane to transport cattle, haul hay, move agricultural
equipment, and park cars. During this time, each family relied on the lane to access the rear of
their respective acreage. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff proved these elements by clear
and convincing evidence.
The Defendants contend that use of the lane by the McNaughtens was by permission, and
therefore not adverse to Witts' interests. Ms. Housel testified that her Grandfather Witt was
"particular about protecting the lane." However, the weight of the evidence demonstrates clearly
and convincingly otherwise. Multiple witnesses testified that neither the Witts nor the
McNaughtens ever asked permission of the other to use the lane. Rather, the respective families
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jointly used the lane to access their acreage, run cattle, haul hay, move farm equipment, and park
cars as often as either found it necessary and convenient. In so finding, the Court notes that the
testimony of Mr. Eldon Carlisle concerning use of the lane from the 1930's through the 1950's
was particularly credible.
The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those presented in Richins v. Struhs, 17
Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966). In that case, the parties owned adjoining properties on
Emigration Creek. The creek separated both properties from the road. In 1918, their
predecessors in interest "jointly constructed [a] bridge and roadway and so maintained and used
it so long as they owned the properties (until the 1950's)." Id., 412 P.2d at 315. The bridge and
driveway were constructed "between the two properties on what was assumed to be the
boundary." Id., 412 P.2d at 316. In 1960, the Struhs purchased one of the properties. After
obtaining a survey, they "erected a fence in the driveway on what they assert [was] the true
boundary." Id. That fence blocked the driveway, and the adjoining property owner's access.
The trial court held that because the predecessors in interest had "used the driveway
harmoniously and without conflict... the use was permissive and . . . therefore no prescriptive
right to use the driveway arose." Id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial
court's conclusion did not "give effect to fundamental principles applicable to prescriptive
rights." Id. The Court explained:
In order for the use to have been permissive it would have to
appear that the parties understood that the driveway was upon the
Whipple's (defendant's predecessors) property; that it was with
this understanding that they gave their consent to its use; and
similarly that the Joneses (plaintiffs' predecessors) so understood
and accepted and used it. No such view of the facts is warranted
by the evidence... . [I]t is our opinion that the reasonable
T3

conclusion to be drawn from the facts here shown, where the
parties (predecessors) jointly established and used a driveway on
what they thought their common boundary, is that the use meets
the requirement of being open, notorious, continuous, and adverse
for more than 20 years and therefore has established a prescriptive
right to continue to so use it.
LI, 412 P.2d at 316-17. See, Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 121 (Utah Ct App. 1994)
(explaining that use of the common driveway in Struhs was always adverse because "defendant's
predecessor did not know that the bridge was on his property [and] . . . could not have granted
permission").
Here, there is no evidence that the Witts understood that the lane was on their property.
The first efforts to ascertain the true boundary line were not pursued until 1999 when the Plaintiff
and Defendants each obtained conflicting surveys. Like the adjoining property owners in Struhs,
the Witts and McNaughtens established and harmoniously used a common lane from the 1930fs
through at least the mid-1970's. That use is as a matter of law open, notorious, continuous and
adverse for more than 20 years and establishes a prescriptive right in favor of Plaintiff.
Abandonment
"It is well-recognized that an easement or right of way may be abandoned." Western
Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977). "Proof of abandonment of
such an easement requires action releasing the ownership and the right to use with clear and
convincing proof of an intentional abandonment." Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 765
(Utah 1962).
In determining the issue of abandonment, courts should consider "whether or not the right
was acquired by prescription or grant, the extent of its use, and the actual intent of the owner."
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Western Gateway Storage, 567 P.2d at 182. As to the issue of intent, abandonment requires the
owner to "cease[] to use the easement... with the intention to make no further use of it."
Harmon, 375 P.2d at 765. "An easement is considered abandoned when there is a history of nonuse coupled with an act or omission showing clear intent to abandon." Easements & Licenses In
Real Property, 25 Am. Jur. 2d § 112. Adverse use by the owner of the servient estate, acquiesced
in by the owner of the dominant estate, may constitute abandonment. Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va.
296, 541 S.E. 2d. 556 (2001).
In the instant case, the gate blocking the lane was constructed in the early 1980?s. From
that date, Plaintiff ceased to use the lane west of the gate. For more than 20 years, Plaintiff has
acquiesced in the closure, never taking any action to object. This history of non-use and inaction
show a clear intent on the part of Plaintiff to abandon the lane west of the gate.
Scope of the Remaining Prescriptive Easement
From the 1930's through at least the mid-1960's, the McNaughtens used the lane in
connection with a large dairy and range cattle operation. During this period, use of the lane to
run cattle, haul hay, move equipment, and park cars was common. The operation declined in
scope from 1965 to 1980. However, use of the lane for these purposes continued, although to a
lesser degree. By 1979, the McNaughtens had established the large access road north or their
home and routinely used it to access their acreage and barn.
After the death of Mr. McNaughten in 1980, the McNaughtens' use of the lane for
agricultural purposes declined precipitously. At the time of Ms. McNaughten's death in 1984,
that use had ceased. From 1984 and continuing to the present, Plaintiff has used the lane only as
a driveway to allow tenants to access the rear of the McNaughten home and its accessory
15

apartment.
The Court concludes that from 600 West to the gate, the Plaintiffs have a prescriptive
easement for a driveway. The width of the driveway shall be commensurate with the width
required by Heber City ordinances to accommodate one residence used for multi-family
purposes.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to prove boundary by acquiescence. The Court grants judgment in favor
of Defendants on this cause of action. Plaintiff prevails in part on the claim for prescriptive
easement. The length, width, and scope of the easement are set forth in this ruling.
The Court requests that counsel for Plaintiff prepare an order and judgment consistent
with this ruling. The order shall contain a legal description of the easement granted herein. As
stipulated by the parties, the Court orders Plaintiff to obtain and pay the costs of a survey
identifying the prescriptive easement.
DATED this ^ 5

day of November, 2005.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARTH LUNT, Trustee of the GARTH 0.
LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST,

CASE NUMBER: 020500612
DATED: NOVEMBER 15,2006

Plaintiff,
RULING
vs.
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE
HAROLD LANCE and DIANA LANCE,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion for new trial, or in the
alternative to amend the judgment and/or take additional testimony. I have carefully read all
motions and memoranda and have considered the oral arguments presented in this matter. I now
deny defendants' motion.
RULING
1.

Defendants Do Not Warrant a New Trial Under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "both the granting of, and the refusing to grant, a

new trial is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge . . . ." Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). However, before a court may exercise its discretion in granting a new
trial, the moving party must present "a showing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 292 n.2 (Utah 1962).
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides generally that a trial judge may grant a
new trial for any of the following causes: (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court; (2)
misconduct of the jury; (3) accident or surprise; (4) newly discovered evidence; (5) excessive or
inadequate damages; (6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict; or (7) error in law.
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 59(a). While defendants have not specifically stated the grounds under Rule

59(a) for which they seek a new trial, it appears from their arguments that they believe the
evidence provided in the original trial was insufficient to justify the verdict.
There is no question that it is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the facts provided by them. State ex rel B. G, 2006 UT App 227
(2006); see also State v. Robins, 142 P.3d 589, 593 (citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337,
1342 (Cal. 1975) ("[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness.")). Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the finding of
whether an easement exists is "the type of highly fact-dependent question, with numerous
potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying
the correct legal standard to the given set of facts." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah
1998). Though defendants claim that the testimony of plaintiff s witnesses is insufficient to
satisfy the "clear and convincing" evidence standard necessary to grant a prescriptive easement,
Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), Judge Pullan was in the best
position to make that determination.
In Judge Pullan's November 28, 2005, ruling (hereinafter the "ruling"), he acknowledges
that the testimony of defendants' witnesses was directly contradicted by testimony from
plaintiffs witnesses. Ruling, pp. 3-10. Said differently, Judge Pullan was not able to harmonize
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the testimony of the various witnesses of the parties. However, after weighing the evidence and
credibility of the witnesses, Judge Pullan concluded that plaintiff had successfully proven the
elements of a prescriptive easement by "clear and convincing evidence." Ruling, p. 12.
Referring to one of plaintiff s witnesses, Judge Pullan noted that "the testimony of Mr. Eldon
Carlisle . .. was particularly credible." Ruling, p. 13. However, referring to the testimony of one
of defendants' witnesses, Judge Pullan stated, "the weight of the evidence demonstrates clearly
and convincingly otherwise." Ruling, p. 12.
That contradictory evidence was presented throughout the trial does not mean that the
evidence in favor of granting the prescriptive easement was not clear and convincing. Every trial
contains contradictory evidence. That is the nature of the adversarial legal system. It is the
primary responsibility of the trial judge to weigh and judge the credibility of competing witness
testimony and to make decisions thereon. Defendants' "sincere and compelling belief that the
trial judge made an incorrect ruling does not warrant a new trial.
Defendants' second challenge is that Judge Pullan's involvement with the Heber City
Planning Commission with respect to this property warrants a new trial. Though neither party
addressed Judge Pullan's involvement with the Heber City Planning Commission in great detail
in their memoranda, it appears from oral argument that his involvement as a member of the
planning commission did not create a bias or prejudice which justifies a new trial in this matter.
As Chairman of the planning commission, Judge Pullan was one of several members of that body
who dealt with the issue of plaintiff s property. He did not act alone. Additionally, at the
beginning of the trial Judge Pullan remembered his previous involvement with plaintiffs
property and asked the parties if they objected to his trying the case. At that time, neither party
objected. Having failed to object at that time, when the issue was squarely addressed to the

parties by Judge Pullan, plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain. Judge Pullan's previous
involvement with plaintiffs property does not warrant a new trial.
2.

Defendants Are Not Entitled To Be Relieved From or Amend the Judgment Based
on Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure .
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states six reasons for which a party may

be relieved from judgment. While the first five reasons deal with specific circumstances and
events, the sixth reason serves as a residuary clause, stating that a party may be relieved from
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

UTAH R.

CIV. P. 60(b)(6). Since defendants have not alleged any of the first five clauses of Rule 60(b),
the court must assume that they intend to gain relief from the judgment based on the residuary
clause of Rule 60(b)(6).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the residuary clause found in Rule 60(b)(6)
"embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than those listed in subdivisions
(1) through [(5)]; second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be made within
a reasonable time." Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass '«, 657 P.2d 1304, 1307.
Defendants clearly have complied with the first and third requirements established by the Utah
Supreme Court. However, defendants have not complied with the second requirement because
their Rule 60(b)(6) motion fails to state a reason that justifies relief. Defendants' "sincere and
compelling belief that plaintiff in fact did not use the lane in the manner asserted by plaintiffs
witnesses and found by the Court" is insufficient to justify relief. Instead, it appears that
defendants are attempting to use Rule 60(b) as an appeal to the trial court from the court's own
ruling and judgment. Defendants had their opportunity at trial to show that plaintiff did not use
the lane in the manner asserted by plaintiffs witnesses, but failed satisfactorily to do so. After
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both parties presented their case, Judge Pullan found in plaintiffs favor with regard to the
prescriptive easement. Defendants simply have no reason which justifies amending or relieving
them from the judgment.
Conclusion
I deny defendants' motion. Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
plaintiffs counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this (5 day of November, 2006.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Garth l.unt.

:
. . .

:

Ruling

vs.

:

Date: May 3,2006

Harold Lance,

:

Case Number: 020500612

:

Presiding Ju age janu> K. rI a> ior

Respondent

This matter comes before the Court, sitting as a "reviewing judge" by certification from

for Rule 63 Removal of Judge" filed by the Petitioner.
Rule 63(b)(3)(A) requires this Court to determine if the motion aiiu uiiiua\ n arc umciy
i'ka '\e;I > L>ood faith and legally sufficient. Each requirement will be discussed.
Rule 63(b)(1)(A) states:
"A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a
certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be
supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show bias,
prejudice or conflict of interest."
Rule 63(b)(1) (B) states further that the motion must be filed not later than 20 days after
the moving party discovered the grounds for the motion.
1 hi>« ease was tried hi fore Jink1!1 PIIIIIIN on Noventibni 1 "' ^OOS Judge Pullan entered a
Ruling on November 23, 2005. Oral argument on objections to a proposed order from that ruling
Page ] of

5

was heard on February 16, 2006. In the middle of the first day of trial, November 1, 2005, Judge
Pullan noted, on the record, that "[i]n chambers I indicated that when I was the County Attorney
for Wasatch County, I was consulted about the boundary line issue. My recollection is in this
general area. I have no recollection with whom I talked." The parties made an affirmative
determination at that time that they had no concerns about a possible conflict of interest. The
Judge's ruling was that although the Plaintiff had failed to establish a boundary by acquiescence
the claim for a prescriptive easement had been established, in part. The Plaintiff was ordered to
obtain and pay the costs of a survey to identify the prescriptive easement. After oral argument on
February 16, 2006 the Court stated, further, that the easement was to be 20 feet in width and
measured from the center line of the street, east to 600 West. In early March, 2006, while doing
research to prepare the required easement on of the Defendants discovered that when Judge
Pullan was the Wasatch County Attorney in 1998 the property considered in this case was before
the Heber City Planning Commission for a requested zone change. Judge Pullan was the acting
chair of the commission when the commission recommended a zone change as requested by
Moneves Boren. Ms. Boren subsequently testified in the trial of this case.
This Court has carefully reviewed Judge Pullan's Ruling. He necessarily made extensive
findings of fact about the historic use and condition of the property from the late 1920's through
the present. The past, present or future zoning classification of the area was not considered or
relevant to his conclusion that from the 1930's through at least the mid-1970's there was open,
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notorious, continuous and adverse use of the subject lane for more than 20 years to establish a .
prescriptive right in favor of the Plaintiff.
File first question raised by this motion is whether the requisite 20 day period began with
Judge Pullan's disclosure during the first day of trial or whether the period should begin when
Ms I ance disco v ered that Ii idge • I i illan se .:

'

" e Planning Commission \ vhen

a request to re-zone the property was recommended i». : iJ -*••

n j focus of the Defendant's

complaint is not upon the substance of Juagc i «,4«n ., /«!;.... L .. ..^estions whether there is an
appearance of impropriety because he was called upon to impartially consider the testimony of
Ms. Boren, the applicant in the zone change and a witness during this trial. There is no

the trial that he had no recollection of any other involvement with the property. The zoning
hearing preceded the trial by more than seven years. Nevertheless, because .irj ....... . _.- /.-.•.
to the common participation of Ms. Boren in both instances it is reasonable that the 20 day period
commence from when it was discovered that Judge Pullan was involved in both proceedings.
I his ni i Dtion w as filed on I\. larch 24 2006 just ni lie days after Ms. I -ance received the .
documentation from Heber City that indicated Judge Pullan's participation," Fhe motion is,
U i j r e u j-_.

iii.^'if.

This motion is accompanied by the affidavit of Diana Lance, In paragraph 13 she states
"I am filing the accompanying Motion to Disqualify based on a good-iaun ; d u i iiuu u.v. judge's
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impartiality in this matter can reasonably be questioned." The Court will accept this portion of
the affidavit as the requisite certification under the rule.
The unusual dilemma presented by this motion is that it does not seek to merely conclude
the prospective involvement of Judge Pullan, the moving party seeks a determination that a trail
already concluded was tainted and should be set aside. No specific references to the trial, written
ruling or subsequent proceedings have been made to demonstrate actual bias or prejudice. Rule
63 addresses the prospective involvement of a judge and is not intended to determine
proceedings already concluded. Questions about a trial already conducted and a ruling already
rendered must be determined by either the appellate process or through Rule 60, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The moving party addresses only the appearance of impropriety. The available record is
that Judge Pullan had no recollection of the previous proceeding involving the same witness.
Nevertheless, this motion would, at the least, remind him of those proceedings. This Court
concludes that there may at least be an appearance of impropriety should he continue with the
case under these circumstances.
Accordingly, while this Court declines to set aside the trial or ruling of Judge Pullan, this
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matter will be reassigned to Judge Anthony W. Schofield for such other proceedings as shall be
appropriate.
Dated this 3

Judge Jaj
Fourth/Judicial
Copies of this Order mailed to:
,'^m.H toi f i r PlainlilV

Randy B. Birch
139 E. South Temple, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, I Jtah 84111
Counsel for the Defendants:
Kraig J. Powell
2 South Main Street, Suite _-;J
Heber City, Utah 84032
Mailed this

_day of

/ASK,,,

A 2006, postage pre-paid as noted above.

Court Clerk
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Testimony of
Elden Carlisle

MR. GREENWOOD:
just on cross

Well, I'll probably take 10, 15 minutes

examination.

THE COURT:

And you'll be five minutes?

MR. GREENWOOD:
T H E C 0 URT :

Five or ten.

01 :: a} , W : • J ] ] :i e c i ] ; a t 1 2 : 3 0 f : :i " J i 11 I c : 1: i .

Mr. Ca r 1 i s 1 e, if you'll come forward.
MR. BIRCH:

Or earlier if were done that, I hope.

THE COURT:

You/] 1 need to come right here first, s i r .

Raise your r i gI It hand, and take an oath.
COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimoi ly

V J U shall give in the matter n o w before this Court shall be the
• i 111: I , 1 1 i e w 1 I c: ] = t r i 111 i

a i I d i I c t h i i i g b i I 1: t h e t r u 11 I , s o h e"1p y o i i

-.od?
THE W I T N E S S : Y e s .
THE C O U R T :

Thank you, M r . C a r l i s l e .

If you'll take the

••'itness stand.
ELDON CARLISLE
having been first duly sworn,
t e s t i f j e s a s fo ] 3 ows i
DIRECT E X A M I N A T I O N
BY: M R . B I R C H :
Q,

M r . Carlisle, I appreciate you being here today.

i t's p r o b a b l y n o t what y o u do f o r a fun t i m e .
i t's i n t e r e s t i n g .

On t h e other hand,

I hope you've e n j o y e d at least ii i par t.

you t e l l t h e C o u r t your n a m e , p l e a s e ?

I know

Could.

-115A.

Eldon Carlisle.

Q.

How old are you, Mr. Carlisle?

A.

I'm 88.

Q.

How long have you lived in Heber?

A.

Most all the time.

I was away three-and-a-half years in

the Army.
Q.

Okay.

When were you in the military?

A.

From M l to ^96.

Q.

From M l to how long?

A.

From M l to M 6 .

Q.

Oh, M 6 , okay.

That was the longest stint I had ever

heard of for a minute.
A.

Yeah, longest years.

Q.

Seemed like that long maybe.

All right.

Did you know

the McNaughtons?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Link McNaughton in particular?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How did you know Link?

A.

We were neighbors.

Q.

Okay.

A.

At 218 West Center.

Q.

Not too far from where you live now, is it?

A.

That's right.

Q.

Okay".

Where did you live back then?

When you -- how old -- were you and Link the same

1

age in school?

2

A

3

No, Lincoln was about a year, a year-and-a-half older

tl ian I was .

4

Q,

Okay.

5

1

i' : !

6

Q

Okay.

' I

So did you guys -- were you friends?

MR. BIRCH:
your Honor.

I just noticed we're missing a photograph,

I don't know --

MR. GREENWOOD:
THE COURT'

I c ic :»i r 1 ., Counsel.

MR. BIRCH:

Did it fall?

ME

GREENWOOD

I don't see it fallen.

Wl ] i :1: < >i n • i ; i t?

MR. BIRCH:

It's 5-B.

THE COURT:

It's 5-B.

MR. GREENWOOD:
g<~>t 5-B.

Does the Court have it?

We will look diligently and see if we've

Your Honor, my mistake.

I had it (inaudible).

Sorry,

r: idy.

21

|

Q.

MR. BIRCH:

Just trying to keep track of things, your

THE COURT:

Thank you.

BY MR. BIRCH:

Okay.

I've got these photographs over

here, if you want to pull them off and bring them over.

Are you

i .^miliar with this lane that we're talking about here today?
Idi i ig

you Ex1 I i b i t 5 -A,

D o y o i i r e c o g i I i z e 11 I a t p r o p e i t y ?

I'm

-1171

Q.

What is that?

2

A.

That's on the south side of the McNaughton house.

3

Q.

Is that where Link lived?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Did you ever have occasion to go travel that lane?

8

A.

I used to go down there occasionally with Lincoln when

9

Do you see a lane in that picture?

he drove his cows down there.

10

Q.

So you

—

11

A.

When we were boys.

12

Q.

When you were boys.

13

A.

Several years ago.

14

Q.

- - a few years ago, okay.

So that would have been

—

You drove cattle down that

15

this is like periodically, daily, how often did you do that?

16

you recall?

17
18

A.

—
Do

Well, I can't tell you how often, but occasionally

during the summer we did.

19

Q.

Okay.

Do you remember how many years you did that for?

20

A.

No, I can't remember how many years, but it was several

21

years.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

The Whitts did.

24

Q.

Okay.

2T5

A.

When we were boys and after we grew up, then as long as

Did you see anybody else ever use that lane?

What did you see them do with it?

I

-118-

1

the Whitts lived there.

2 J

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

They had access

4

Q.

6

A.

8

13

Oh, it was probably approximately a fourth of a block,

Q.

Then where did the McNaughtons go?

A.

Then they went in the gate on the north side of the lane

into their property.
Q.

Okay.

So they went down the lane and turned to the

north into their own property?

14

A.

Right.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

When the McNaughtons took their cows down it, how

maybe a third of a block.

9 1

12

Okay.

far down the lane did they go?

7

11

to their barn that was down at the end

of the lane.

5

10

What did they do on that lane -- along that lane?

Did you ever hear anyone object to either the

Whitts or the McNaughtons using that lane?

17

A.

No, I didn't.

18

Q.

Did you ever hear anyone —

well, strike that.

19

other use of that property?

20

fisherman, rocket scientists go up and down that lane?

21

purpose?

22

A.

Any

Did you ever see any hunters,

Well, we probably did when we were children.

Any other

We'd go

23

down that lane and climb over the fence and go swimming in the

24

canal.

25

Q.

Okay.
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2

A.

Then there was probably some fisherman, but I couldn't

tell you whether there was or wasn't.

3

Q.

And I'm just asking what you recall, okay 9

How about --

4

since you got back from the mil -- since you were released from

5

the military, have you had occasion to go out to this property?

6

A.

Yes, occasionally when the McNaughtons would bring their

7

cattle from the north field down there for fall or some such

8

thing as for feed it off.

9
10

Q.

Okay.

Bear with me here.

You said when you were a kid,

so this would have been before 1941; is that correct?

11

A.

Yeah, I think so.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

That's right.

14

Q.

Through M 6 , and subsequent to that you -- what have you

Then in 1941 you were in the military?

15

observed along that lane?

16

observed along the lane?

17

A.

So say since the

y

50's

Well, just the lane was there and McNaughtons went back

18

and forth on it probably and probably the Whitts.

19

remember when the Whitts died.

20
21

Q.

what have you

Okay.

I don't

As long as they were alive you remember seeing

them on the lane?

22

A.

23

Yes.
MR. BIRCH:

24

Honor.

25

///

Okay.

I have no further questions, your
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2
3
4

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. GREENWOOD:
Q.

Eldon, you remember seeing any willow trees next to that

common lane?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Describe to the Court the willow trees.

7

A.

Well, a tree that was up closer to the house was on the

8

north side of the lane.

9

the bottom was down by the canal at the end of the lane.

I'd say these willow trees down here on

10

Q.

All right.

11

A.

Not at the end of the lane, but at the end of Whitts'

12

Were there any willow trees

—

property.

13

Q.

14

property ?

15

A.

Right.

16

Q.

Were there any willow trees next to the house, closer to

17

the hous e?

18

A.

To the McNaughton house?

19

Q.

Yes.

20

A.

Well, there's one not too far from the west corner of

So it wasn't the end of the lane, but the end of the

21

the McNaughton house.

22

branches of it come over here.

23

Q

24

A.

I'm 88.

25

Q.

Oh, 88.

*

I don't see it in here, unless this is the

How old are you?

Are you 86?

So you worked for the Whitts, right?

-1211

A.

No, I didn't work for the Whitts.

2

Q.

Did you -- tell me again how you lived.

3

Did you -- you

knew -- you worked for the McNaughtons, then 9

4

A.

I was -- the McNaughtons.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

As far as being an enemy of the Whitts, I wasn't an

7
8
9
10
11

You worked for the McNaughtons, right?

enemy of the Whitts.
Q.

I was friendly with everybody.

Did you ever have a chance to see Mr. Whitt and

Mr. McNaughton interact?
A.

Yes, I seen them together, but I never did see them

arguing or anything.

12

Q.

Did you ever see them using the lane together?

13

A.

Well, I don't remember seeing them passing each other at

14

the lane, but they both used the lane.

15

Q.

Who do you think owned the lane?

16

A.

Well, I imagine it come off --

17

MR. BIRCH:

Objection, foundation.

18

THE COURT:

Sustained.

19
20

Q.

BY MR. GREENWOOD:

Who do you think spent more time

the lane, the Whitts or the McNaughtons?

21

A.

Well, probably the Whitts.

22

Q.

What makes you say the Whitts spent more time in the

23

They lived closer.

lane?

24

A.

Sir?

25

Q.

They spent -- they lived closer?

m

I
1
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Yeah, the Whitts lived —

2

Dust on the south side of the lane.

3

were boys, wasn't there.

they had —

McNaughtons' house, when we

They lived in town.

4

Q.

This was in 19 -- give me the year.

5

A.

Oh, I don't —

6

their house was

Lincoln built that house probably m

M6

or 7.

7

Q.

Do you recall the property in 1930?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Before the basement was built?

10

A.

That's right.

11

Q.

Was there a fence that extended all the way to 6th West 9

12

A.

There was, except there was a gate m

13
14
15

it.

As far as the

fence, 1 guess you would call the gate part of the fence.
Q.

But it extended all the way from the canal all the way

up to 6th West —

6th North?

16

A.

That's right.

17

Q.

That fence was taken down when they built the basement

18

house, right?

19

A.

I don't remember.

20

Q.

We're talking about Exhibit 5-A, this picture.

21

recognize the house there?

22

A.

I -- the property would run west of here.

23

Q.

But picture in your mind 1930.

24
25

Do you

Would there have been a

fence that ran all the way down to the road?
A.

There would have been a fence that would have come from
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here up to here.

2

Q.

Show the Court.

3

A.

It would

—

4

MR. BIRCH:

If I may, your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

You may.

6

THE WITNESS:

7

THE COURT:

it would

And how far would that fence have been from

the house?

10

THE WITNESS:

11

MR. GREENWOOD:

12

THE COURT:

13

THE WITNESS:

14

have been -- run up to the —

run up clear to the road.

8
9

—

Well, I

—

In terms of (inaudible) size distance.

Size.

I know the house wasn't there, but

Well, I've never paid any attention how

close the house was built to the fence.

15

THE COURT:

16

of that lane, then?

17

Would the fence have been on the north side

THE WITNESS:

That fence would have been on the north

18

side of this lane, but it would have been on the south side of

19

the house.

20
21
22

—

THE COURT:
Q.

Okay.

BY MR. GREENWOOD:

Thank you.
And it would have been, would you

say, three or four feet from the house?

23

A.

I would say so.

24

Q.

You wouldn't say 10 or 15, would you?

25

A.

No, I wouldn't think that would be that far.
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2

Q.

Now along that line there were some willow trees.

Were

there some willow trees along that fence line behind the house?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Do you remember how big they were back in --

5

A.

They was pretty big trees.

6

Q.

Okay.

7 I

A.

Yes, they've been there as far back as I can remember.

Q.

Did you ever see the trees trimmed?

A.

No.

10

Q.

Who was it that —

11

the trees?

12

A.

No, I never seen anything hanging on the trees.

13

Q.

Which side of the fence were the trees growing on?

14

A.

Well, I'd say they was pretty close to the fence line,

9 I

They have been there for awhile?

you ever see anyone hang things on

15

but they might have been just slightly on the north side of the

16

fence.

17

Q.

18

North side of the fence, which would be the McNaughton

side?

19

A.

On the McNaughton side.

20

Q.

You think that the McNaughtons consider that a boundary?

21

A.

I don't know whether they considered it a boundary or

Q.

Now in 1950 do you remember seeing this gate between the

22
23
24
25

not.

willow trees?
MR. BIRCH:

If I may, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS:

3

there or not.

4

was there forever.

5
6
7

Q.

You may.
Well, I don't remember whether it was

It probably was.

BY MR. GREENWOOD:

As far as I remember the gate

Okay.

Describe the use of that gate

when you saw it being used.
A.

Well, the McNaughtons drove cattle through it and they

8

drove their wagon through it.

9

open the gate and let their stock through to get water in the

10

canal.

11

Q.

12

In the winter the Whitts would

Now let's talk about this use.

Are we talking going

north and south --

13

A.

Right.

14

Q.

—

15

A.

Right.

16

Q.

Did you ever see the McNaughtons bring cattle on their

17
18

taking the cattle through?

property by any other way?
A.

Yes, there was a gate over on the south side of their

19

property, which would be west where the -- this is the one.

20

by these trees the Whitt property cornered and went south, and

21

the McNaughton property still joined (inaudible).

22

little gate over on the south side of the McNaughton property

23

that they could get their cows through, but they couldn't get a

24

wagon through.

25

Q.

Okay.

This was 19 —

what years?

Down

There was a
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A.

Well, it's been forever.

2

Q.

Forever.

3

Did you ever see the cows being brought onto

the McNaughton property from 6th West?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Other than through this common lane, ma ybe further to

6

the north?

7

A.

8
9
10

I even helped do them.

No, I don't remember.

There may have been a little wire

gate there, but I don't remember using it.
Q.

Now there were some willow trees out fr ont on 6th West,

weren' t there?

11

A.

That's true.

12

Q.

There was a gate between those two will ow trees; isn't

13

that t rue?

14

A.

It could have been between the trees.

15

Q.

And that the cows were led through that gate between the

16
17
18

two wi H o w trees in the front on 6th West?
A.

They could have been, but they was also brought through

the wooden gate down the lane.

19
20

That's true.

MR. GREENWOOD:
Honor.

Just one minute.

Could I have just a moment?

21

THE COURT:

22

(Counsel confers with client)

23

MR. GREENWOOD:

24

MR. BIRCH:

25

Just one moment, your

there if you want.

You may.

That's all I have, your Honor.

Thank you, your Honor.

You can leave it

I'm not going to look at it.
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2

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BIRCH:

3

Q.

Mr. Carlisle, for me it's almost enjoyable to do some of

4

these kinds of cases because I get to talk to people who are --

5

who have experienced things I've only read about.

6

your time here today.

7

A.

In 1917.

8

Q.

Okay, 1917.

9
10

I appreciate

You indicated you were born in what vear?

So when you said you were running cows up

and down this lane as a kid, we were talking in the 1920's and
N

30's?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

So that lane existed clear back in the

13

A.

It was there as far back as I can remember.
MR. BIRCH:

15

MR. GREENWOOD:

16

THE COURT:

Briefly.

17

MR. BIRCH:

I'm just going to fix the pictures.

19
20
21

Thank you.

20's and '30's?

14

18

Okay.

A

No further questions.

Redirect?

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. GREENWOOD:
Q.

In the ^20's and

x

30's were there cars parked on that

lane?

22

A.

I think Whitts had a car.

23

Q.

The Whitts parked a car on that lane?

24

A.

I think though, and then I think they parked it in the

25

garage that was on the south side of the lane.

It was an old
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2
3

wooden structure.
Q.

Were they milking cows in the ^20 1 s and

30's on 1the

McNaughton p roperty?

4

A.

5

a machine.

6

Q.

Do you remember when that stopped happen!.ng?

7

A.

No, I don't.

8

Q.

Do you remember when the barn was taken down?

9

A.

I h ave no idea.

Yes , and that's when they milked cows by hand, not wi bh

10

MR. GREENWOOD:

11

MR. BIRCH:

May this witness be excused, your Honor?

12

THE COURT:

(inaudible) question for him.

Okay.

Thank you.

Carlisle, and I' 11 allov\i both of you to

13

have one que stion for Mr

14

follow up on it.

15

running cattle on the lane, or if they ever did?

16
17

I thin)c I do

Do you know when the McN aughtons stopped

THE WITNESS:

I don't remember when they stopped, but it

would probably be either in the late

18

THE COURT:

19

THE WITNESS:

x

80 f s or

x

90 f s, early ^90 •s.

Okay.
I can't remember wh<an Lincc In died, but we

20

were good friends up until he died, and he still h ad stock at

21

that time.

22

THE COURT:

All right.

23

MR. BIRCH:

No questions.

24

THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Greenwo od?

25

Q.

BY MR. GREENWOOD:

Thank you

Just —

the cattle was ran into the
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property ?

2

A.

We would go down there if -- like I said, I had younger

3

brothers and sisters down there, and my parents were there and we

4

would come over here to do shopping and that and we would call on

5

them.

6
7

Q.

Okay.

Did you ever visit -- when you say call on them,

you mean visit your parents?

8

A.

Pardon?

9

Q.

When you say call on them, do you mean visit them?

10

A.

Visit them.

11

Q.

Okay.

12
13

Did you ever help with the -- any of the chores

that nee ded to be done?
A.

Just milking the cows.

When Link would -- was working

14

over to the mines and it was cold in the morning and snowing and

15

he had to leave so early, that when the sun come out I would go

16

out and milk.

17

Q.

Do you remember what years that was?

18

A.

That was in the M 8 and M9's.

19

Q.

But subsequent to 1955 how often have you visited the

20

site?

After 1955 how often did you go by?

21

A.

Often.

22

Q-

Okay.

23

A.

We —

24
25

i

I don't know.

our children was here in school, and then they

took the school out of Wallsburg and we moved over here, and -Q.

Do you recall --
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A.

I am.

2

Q.

How long do you -- do you recall when you first observed

3

that lane?

4

A.

When I went there in M 8 .

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Can you tell me what you observed in 1948 its use --

Was it being used on a regular basis?

8

well, I'm talking like a lawyer.

9

I'll fix that.

10

A.

Let me take a deep breath and

What did they use the lane for back in 1948?

The Whitts used it to travel down to their —

11

of their house to the garage to park their car.

12

down —

13

lane for we didn't have room in the front.

14

snow got deep in there we couldn't get out anyway.

15

park cars.

16

barn.

17

to take them to the north field, just the general use.

18
19

Q.

to go down through there to park —

Well, and when the
We used it to

In the summer we used it to take our hay back to the

We used it to put cattle down in there and take them out

Okay.

How long did they use that property to, as you

put, to put cattle down in there?
A.

I don't know that they've ever stopped.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

Yesterday.

23

Q.

Okay.

25

We used it

down the side of the

20

24

the back

When was the last time you visited the property?

Did you have an opportunity to walk that lane and

refresh your memory?
A.

I did.
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went from north to south?

2

A.

I did.

3

Q.

And how far was that?

4

A.

From the chimney back there on the apartment over to the

5
6

wooden fence there was 35 feet.
Q.

Okay.

How about from 6th West where the asphalt is, how

7

far back do you believe the ext -- well, let me ask you this.

8

You've talked about a barn.

9

there.

How far back -- to what monument or what existed -- how

10

far back did that lane go?

11

stop?

12
13

A.

You've talked about taking hay back

To what did it stop or where did it

Do you mean where it stopped that we used it, or where

the lane stopped?

14

Q.

No, where you've used it.

15

A.

As I --

16

Q.

—

17

A.

Pardon?

18

Q.

Was there a building or something?

19

A.

No.

building or something?

There was all the buildings over on the Whitt side

20

went clear back down in there.

21

side, and there was a gate in there.

22

Q.

Was there a --

Okay.

Bear with me.

We had the fence down on our

When you say our side, let me show

23

you on Exhibit 5-D, when you say there was a fence down there,

24

are you referring to this fence here?

25

A.

Bring it up, I

—
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Q.

Let me get it closer.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

There was a gate down in this fence that went down here

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Sorry about that.

There was a gate in that, you say?

below that tree.
Q.

Okay.

Do you recall how far from the road approximately

that fence was -- or excuse me, the gate, the gate was?
A.
where —

Yesterday I tried to line it up with where we went in to
the barn, and it was 235 feet from the edge of the

asphalt down to where I figured it went across to the barn.
Q.

Okay.

Do you recall —

12

or the west side of the fence —

13

about there?

would that have been at the east
the gate; do you recall, just

14

A.

Of the gate that's in the fence line?

15

Q.

The gate that isn't there anymore, the one that used to

16

be there, do you recall whether -- you said 235 feet, right?

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

Would that have been which side of the gate?

19

A.

It -- we were -- I was over on the --

20

Q.

The gate ran

21

A.

-- north -- or the south side --

22

Q.

-- east and west.

23

A.

-- of the fence line.

24

Q.

Right.

25

A.

I was on"the north side of the fence line.

—
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Q.

Right.

2

A.

It runs east and west.

3

Q.

Right.

4

A.

And I was over on the north side of the fence line.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Right.

7

Q.

All right.

8
9
10

So at 235 feet there was a gate?

Very good.

Now after 1955 you say -- what

use of that lane did you observe?
A.

That was where we took the cattle and the hay and what

we needed to do out in back that we got in.

11

Q.

Did that continue every year?

12

A.

Yes, and we had no other way to get onto the property.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Excuse me, is there a McNaughton barn there now?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Okay.

18
19
20
21
22

Is there a barn there now?

Do you recall when that was destroyed or

demolished?
A.

I think that was moved in the early 1990 f s.

Bliss

Taylor took it, and it is out to the north fields.
Q.

Okay.

So up until the 1990's how did they access that

barn?

23

A.

Who?

24

Q.

Anyone.

25

A.

We came down the lane and went through the gate over to
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the barn.

2

Q.

3

Okay.

Do you recall the Whitts having a barn out there

towards the end of the lane?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

I just remember it was out in the field.

Do you recall where it was located?
I don't know

7

how far it was or anything about it because we turned off and

8

went in to our barn.

9
10

Q.

Okay.

into your barn?

11

A.

Right.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

So you went towards the Whitt barn and turned off

Again, that use continued until the 1990's

sometime; is that correct?

14

A.

Right.

15

Q.

Do you recall anyone else ever using that lane?

16

children,

swimming?

17

A.

No, I

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

I did witness the —

20

don't.

hmm, the —

go down that lane one

time --

21

Q.

The Lances?

22

A.

The Lances, thank you.

Go down that lane one time with

23

the trailer and a horse, and they didn't go in.

24

down to the gate and then came back.

25

School

Q.

Okay.

They just went
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A.

Took their horses out.

2

Q.

Let me show you Exhibit 5-C -- well, 5-B, how's that?

3

It might be a little easier.

4

pile of dirt?

In that photograph can you see a

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Do you know when that was put there?

7

A.

No, I don't.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

Don't know.

10

Q.

Five years ago, 20 years ago?

11

A.

No, it wasn't 20 years ago.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

The Lances.

14

Q.

Okay.

I was there when it was put there.

Approximately when was it?

Do you recall who put it there?

Is it within the area that you have described as

15

the lane?

Did they put the dirt in the lane?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

Well, partially.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

We had a white van out in the lane, and they dumped the

21

rocks and the dirt, and we had to move them before we could get

22

the van around so Trent could get out.

23
24
25

Q.

Okay.

So you believe that was in the 1990's after

Lances bought the property that that happened?
A.

Right.
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pasture and was put in the barn?

2

A.

3

cows were.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

That's right.

6

Q.

When was the last time he was milking cows?

7

A.

I don't remember.

Well, the cattle weren't put in the barn, but the milk

Milk cows in the barn?

8

MR. GREENWOOD:

9

THE COURT:

10

Thank you.

Mr. Carlisle, thank you very much, sir.

You

are free to go.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

MR. BIRCH:

13

Okay.

Thank you.

We can take that lunch break at this time,

your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

Yeah.

15

MR. BIRCH:

It would be a natural time.

16

THE COURT:

The Court will be in recess.

Counsel,

17

let's —

what I'd like to do is go out and see the property right

18

now, if we can, and then we'll reconvene at 1:30 for further

19

testimony.

20

representatives of the Lunts here?

By way of direction to clients or the Lunts -- any

21

MR. BIRCH:

Yes, Garth is here.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

attorney out to the property.

24

Mr. Greenwood, if you'll take your clients.

25

out and see the property so that I have a better understanding of

Mr. Lunt, you can travel with your
I'll follow behind in my vehicle.
I would like to go
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how it' s situated.

2

today; it's not what it looked like in the

3

later.

4

want to tell me what I'm looking at, but I'm not going to hear

5

any of that.

6

do have questions I' 11 pose them to your Counsel f but I can't

7

have yo u speak to me out there about this case.

8

behind.

9

minutes out there.

10

I understand that I'm seeing it as it exists
MO's or

There's a tendency when we go out to do 1zh±s

x

30's or
that you'11

It wou Id be inappropriate for me to do that.

If I

So I'll follow

Mr. Birch, if you can lead the way and we'll take a few
We'11 then take a lunch brea k: and reconvene

at 1:30 •

11

MR. BIRCH:

12

MR. GREENWOOD:

13

THE COURT:

You may.

14

MR. BIRCH:

Can we lock -- make sure it gets locked?

15

THE COURT:

We'll lock it up.

16

MR. BIRCH:

Thanks.

17

COURT BAILIFF:

18

(Noon recess)

19

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.
Can we leave our items .in the courtroom?

All rise.

We're back in the matter of Garth Lunt vs.

20

Harold Lance

The record should reflect that the parties are

21

present together with their respective Counsel.

22

may continue

Mr. Birch, you

23

MR. BIRCH:

Your Honor, we'd call Garth Lunt.

24

THE COURT:

Mr. Lunt, if you'll come forward, sir, to

25

the des k.

Raise you r right hand and take an oath.
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COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

2

you shall give in the matter now before this Court shall be the

3

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you

4

God?

5

THE WITNESS:

6

THE COURT:

7

I do.
Thank you, sir.

Please take the witness

stand.

8

GARTH LUNT

9

having been first duly sworn,

10

testifies as follows:

11

DIRECT EXAMINATION

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

BY MR. BIRCH:
Q.

Garth, could you tell the Court your name and where it

is you currently reside?
A.

My name is Garth Lunt.

I reside at 4090 Branch Street,

No. 2, San Diego, California, 92103.
Q.

Okay.

Mr. Lunt, are -- do —

what's your relationship

to the Garth Lunt Family Trust or living trust?

19

A.

It's a private trust that I have set up.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

At 205 North, 6th West.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Does it own any property here in Heber City?

Where is that property located?

So when we refer to the Lunt property, we're

referring to the property owned by the trust/ is that correct?
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A.

That's correct.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

In 1977.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

That property was bequeathed to me by my deceased

6
7
8

When did you obtain title to that property?

Who did you buy that property from?

brother.
Q.

Excuse me.

brother?

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

And before —

11
12
13

So it was given to you by your deceased

how —

property, if you know?
A.

Well, actually my parents lived there, but I think it

was in 1972, my parents put it -- all the property in my name.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

Oh, gee, before 1947.

16

Q.

Okay.

17
18
19

and before he had it, who owned the

So how long had your parents owned this property?

What happened in 1947?

What caused you to recall

that?
A.

In 1947 my father already owned it and they were going

to build a house.

20

Q.

Okay.

So in 1947 they were going to or they did start

21

to build?

22

A.

They did between 1945 and 1947.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

Were you living at home at that time?

So during M 5 to M 7 they built a house?

Excuse me.

Were
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Q.

Okay.

2

A.

Between M 5 and M 7 .

3
4
5

Is that the house that was built in M 5 ?

went up.
Q.

Okay.

So M 5 to M 7 a basement was built in this house,

but it was in that same location?

6

A.

Exactly.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

We built a basement first and then

Just to the south of the house do you see a lane

or a driveway, however you describe it?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

Forever, as far as I know.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

When the house was being built.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

Correct.

16

Q.

How old are you, Garth?

17

A.

I'm 74.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

Yes, I would say I was because we kept having a problem

How long has that lane or driveway been there?

When do you first recall seeing this property?

That would be 1945, then?

Did you work on the house at all?

20

with water seeping in the basement, so we had to dig out around

21

the basement and put pipes in to drain it.

22

Q.

And you helped with that?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

Well, we used to take cattle and teams of horses up it

What was that lane used for in 1945 through 1950?
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and hay back to the barn and machinery.

2

machiner y would have to come in from the north fields, and we'd

3

park it down there.

4
5

Q.

Okay.

When was the most recent time that you saw this

lane or this property?

6

A.

Yesterday.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

At that time did you have occasion to measure the

width of the lane?

9

A.

I did.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

In the wintertime the

Now what divides the lane from the Whitt

property 9

12

A.

There's a fence and a line of locust trees.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

Is that the wooden fence that we've talked about?

So how wide was the lane from the wooden fence

over towards the house?

17

A.

It's 34 feet.

18

Q.

So 34 feet.

Okay.

Do you recall on the westerly end of

19

that lane there are some -- are there buildings built along that

20

wooden fence?

21

A.

Correct.

22

Q.

Okay.

There is also another fence that runs parallel to

23

the wooden fence, but picks up at about where the end —

24

ends and goes further west; is that correct?

25

A.

Correct.

building
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2

Q.

Okay.

Did you have an opportunity to measure the

distance between that building and that northern fence?

3

A.

Yes, I did.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

The total down to that fence was

6

Q.

No, I'm trying to go width still.

7

the

Do you recall how wide that was?

A.

9

Q.

10

A.

It's 35 feet.

11

Q.

Okay.

15
16

Oh, the width.
width at the western end.

Now is that lane different today than it was back

in 1945, to the best of your recollection?

13
14

A.

It's different because now there's all kind of debris in

Q.

Okay.

it.
Back in 1945 through M 7 how far back did the

lane go?

17

A.

Total to where the old —

18

Q.

Well, tell me this.

19

I'm just measuring

—

8

12

—

like out the old gate was.

Was there some structure back there

to which the lane ended?

20

A.

Went back to Whitt's barn.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

Do you recall when that was removed or demolished?

24

A.

No, it just fell down for years and years and years and

25

finally just --

Now the Whitt barn is no longer there, is it?
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A.

Just worked around the house and visited family.

2

Q.

Okay

3

Did you have occasion to see the use of that --

the area that we' re calling the lane?

4

A.

Oh, of course.

5

Q.

Okay

What was the lane used for?

6

THE COURT:

I'm sorry, Counsel, this is after 1954?

7

MR. BIRCH:

Correct.

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

THE WITNESS :

It was used for -- again, the Whitts

10

hauling hay to their barn, me hauling hay to let's say my barn,

11

equipment going up and down there.

12

cattle that sometimes had to be brought in from the north fields

13

to pasture it down.
BY MR. BIRCH:

14

Q.

15

cattle and

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q-

Okay

18

And you were active in helping move that

Did 1bhat type of activity continue until the barn

was removed in 1991?
A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Okay

22

We had range

—

19

21

We had horses.

What other uses was that lane -- what other

things was that lane used for?
A.

Well, the 0"ther things it was used for, if the county

23

had to go back there and spray thistles, which they often had to

24

do, and there were times when the canal needed cleaning, they

25

would go back and

cliBan it and throw all the dirt up on the
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was hunters or something going up and down there -- fisherman.

2

don't know.

3

I don't see them all.

MR. GREENWOOD:

Okay.

I wasn't here.

But you wouldn't call it a public

4

easement, that's all I'm looking for.

5

a public easement (inaudible) claiming for.

6

MR. BIRCH:

7

MR. GREENWOOD:

8

testified that

9

11

THE COURT:

He's

Just a few more, your Honor.

No.

Would you

Let's finish up with Mr. Lunt if we

can.
MR. GREENWOOD:

Your Honor, when I use the word

"easement," I'm using his

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. GREENWOOD:

18

Well, you think about it.

like to take a break?

14
15

I'll have to think about that.

Anything further?

MR. GREENWOOD:

12
13

You'll stipulate it's not

—

THE COURT:

10

Maybe.

Q.

—

Understood.
His words.

BY MR. GREENWOOD:

All right.

Garth, you testified in

19

your deposition that this use of the land now is no longer being

20

used for milk —

21

A.

milking cows, correct?

Correct, not milking cows, but if you go down there a

22

current day you'll see cows and horses in there, calves being

23

pastured.

24

Q.

25

They came down the lane.
You testified that the real use of this is access

back apartment; is that right?

I

to a
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A.

No, that is incorrect.

rhe use of it is to get back to

2 I an acre of ground that goes west.
3
4

Well, you called this access a driveway for your

Q.

ten ants; isn't that true?

5

A.

Part of it.

6

Q.

If you would describe it , you would describe it as a

7

driveway , not a pathway.

8

A.

I'd describe it as a lane.

9

Q.

A lane.

10
11
12
13
14

You testified p.reviously that it extends only

150 feet from 600 West.
A.

That figure is just down to where that -- where the gate

got move d up to.
Okay.

Q.

You've testified H that the use was just egress and

ingress into the property.

15

A.

Yes, but with cattle and horses and hay and whatever.

16

Q.

All right.

You're aware that in November of

A

88 is when

17

you obtained an electrical permit for an apartment on the back of

18

the home ; isn't that true?

19

A.

When the home was built •—

all right.

The home was

20

built in about M 7 .

21

in the

22

the util ities were put in the apartment.

23

because my sister was living there taking care of my mother.

24

I -- we weren't getting like two <electricity bills and that.

25

Q.

A

60's.

I'll say the apartment was put in on the --

At that time the e!Lectricity naturally and all
They were not cut off
So

Your mother -- you didn'1: rent out the apartment until
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we've got here in the courtroom, didn't you?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

And do you recall how far it is from the highway back to

4

this gat e where the no trespassing sign is put?

5

post?

What were you measuring to; do you recall?

6

A.

I was measuring to a survey peg.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

At 160 feet.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

measured to?

11

asphalt?

That was between -- there was a survey peg you
How far was the survey peg off the highway, the

12

A.

Oh, 15 feet.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

So we've got the asphalt, we've got 15 feet to

the survey peg, and then you measured to another survey peg --

15

A.

Yeah, 160.

16

Q.

—

17

Or is there a

160 —

was 160, 162.

Where is that second survey peg

located at approximately?

18

A.

About

—

19

Q.

Do you need a picture?

20

A.

-- nine feet down from where that -- the gate is, call

21

it a gat e.

22

Q.

I can --

The boards that go across.

All right.

Let me hand you —

whoops —

Exhibit 5-C.

23

You can see the gate with the no trespassing sign on it.

24

the one you're referring to?

25

A.

Yes.

Is that

-1861
2

Q.

Okay.

So you went to that peg and it was 15 plus 162 to

that next peg?

3

A.

Well, 160

4

Q.

Okay, 160

5

Then from that peg to whe re you believe the

Whitt barn and the gate was?

6

A.

It was 62 feet further west •

7

Q.

Okay, further west.

Okay.

So we're going down this

8

lane even further.

9

your t.estimony to where the gate that went to the north, where

10
11
12

Do you recall

— what's yo ur reco llection or

that gate was?
A.

That was at the end of the figures we just went through.

There was about a 'L0 feet wire gate.

13

Q.

14

testified?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

So if I added those numbers up I'd come with how far off

17
18
19
20

So it was approximately 10 feet past the 62 you

the hi ghway you believe that gate was; is that correc t?
A.

About 274 feet.
MR. BIRCH :

Okay.

I'll add those up again.

No further questions, your Honor.

21

THE COURT :

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT :

You are free to remain or go.

24

MR. BIRCH

He'll be here.

~2b

THE COURT

All right.

Thank you.

You may step down.

Thank you, yo ur Honor.

All right.

Tab 4
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what was the property used for; do you know?

2

A.

No.

3 I

Q.

Okay.

So you say you ran cattle and hay into the ^60's.

4

What building existed back when you first got out of the military

5

in

6
7
8
9

A

51; do you recall?
A.

Mr. Whitt had a barn there and a lane there, and we had

a basement home at that time.
Q.

Okay.

house currently sits?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

Is that a basement home that exists where the

It's been expanded and there's some sheds, but

the house was there?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

What was the lane used for?

15

MR. GREENWOOD:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE WITNESS:

Objection, foundation.

Overruled, he may answer.
It was used for us and Mr. Whitt to run

18

fork -- or equipment, mowing machines inside, delivery rakes from

19

one place to another.

20
21

Q.

BY MR. BIRCH:

Okay.

You indicated there was a Whitt

barn at one end of it?

22

A.

Yes, at the end of the lane.

23

Q.

Which direction would that be from

24

A.

West of the 6th South —

25

Q.

Okay.

—

6th West.

Did there come a time when the McNaughtons built
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Q.

How far back from the road do you believe that barn was

2 i located?
3

A.

From clean back to the oil where 6th West --

4

Q.

Yeah.

5

A.

—

6

Q.

Okay.

7

200 and —

about 247, 48 feet.

At that point the lane to the west ended; is that

correct?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

What did Whitts do when they went down that lane?

10

did they go?

11

A.

Back in their field.

12

Q.

That would have been to the south?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

What did the McNaughtons do when they hit the end

of the 1 ane?

16

A.

They'd go on north.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

Where

What was -- isn't there a fence between the

McNaught Dn and the Whitt property?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Back there?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Hasn't there been there -- one there for as long as you

23

can remember?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Okay.

So how did you get through the fence?
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A.

There was a gate that went down through Mr. Whitt's

2

corral that we could go through the gate and back in to our

3

place.

4

Q.

All right.

5

lane f or?

6

A.

7

What would you -- what did you go down that

When we wintered -- or weaned the calves we'd go down

there because the cows would be on this side of the fence, and
we'd go through there and go through that gate to feed the calves
we'd weaned.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

Yes, a bob sleigh and a wagon.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

Did you take equipment down that lane?

Did you ever take any hay equipment down that

lane?

14

A.

Yes, that would be the hay equipment.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

Just the people —

19

Any other use of that lane you can recall?

Who used the lane?

just the people that lived there, me and Mr. Whitt.

20

Q.

Okay.

Did -- was there any discussions between you

— do you recall ever having a discussion with Mr. Whitt

21

and

22

about using the lane?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

me and whoever, but there was mostly

Was there any easement ever granted or any

permission ever granted?
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1

A.

That's

2

Q.

As a matter of fact, did it look like this one?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Okay.

—

Just so they didn't think we were trying to do

5

that with a 10-foot tape.

Did you have an opportunity to measure

6

the distance between the -- what is now asphalt and this fence

7

that you can see in Exhibit 5-B and 5-C, this fence that goes

8

east and west?

9

A.

From the oil?

10

Q.

Yeah.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

It's 175 feet from the oil back to the fence.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

Was there a post or something back there?

How far back is that?

To this fence right here?

How much further past that fence did the old lane

go to the Whitt barn?

18

A.

About 62 feet to the gate where the barn was.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Oh, 10 or 12 feet.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

That was as far, then, as the McNaughtons ever

used the property?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Then how big was the gate?

barn --

Then how wide was it from the back of this

-421

THE COURT:

Counsel, let me stop you aga.m .

2

wanted to ma)<ce sure I understood that.

3

side theat you've talked about goes back how far?

4
5

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:

It's 175 feet from the oil back to the

And how far beyond that was 1the old Whitt

barn?

8

THE WITNESS:

9

MR. BIRCH:

10

The fence on the south

fence.

6
7

I just

It's 62 feet.
Well, that's to the gate, your Honor.

was a gate.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT:

13

Q.

14

the width?

15

fence -•

To the gate where the barn was.
All right.

BY MR. BIRCH :

Now did you have a chance to measure

By that I mean the distance north and south of the

16

A.

Yes

17

Q.

-- of the lane?

Okay.

How far was it from the back

18

side of this barn over to this fence that we can see here in

19

Exhibit 5-D?

20

A.

It';3 35 feet

21

Q.

Okay.

22

There

As yo u came down to the —

by the road, how far

wide is that —

23

A.

Iff 3 35 feet , it was 35.

24

Q.

Okay, and 35 feet put you where ; do you recaill?

25

A.

Put you to the -- within four - - three or four feet of
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Counsel, if you'll approach the bench.

2

(Short recess taken)

3

THE COURT:

4

Thank you.

Please be seated.

What is your

name, ma'am?

5

MS. BOREN:

Pardon?

6

THE COURT:

What is your name?

7

MS. BOREN:

Moneves Boren.

8

THE COURT:

Ms. Boren, if you could raise your right

9

hand, please, and take an oath right here.
COURT CLERK:

10

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

11

you shall give in the matter now before this Court shall be the

12

truth

13

God?

the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

16

I do.
Thank you very much.

You may take the

witness stand.
Counsel, before we begin, in chambers I indicated that

17
18

when I was the county attorney for Wasatch County I was consulted

19

about a boundary line issue, my recollection is in this general

20

area.

21

to my mind.

I have no recollection with whom I talked.

It's just come

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

Have you consulted with your clients about

MR. BIRCH:

I have, your Honor.

24

Judge?

that?

25 I —
—

I have consulted not
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only with my client, but also the witnesses who are family and

2

who have been involved in the dispute over the years.

3

all indicated that you're a handsome fellow, but they don't

4

recall seeing you at any time prior to today, and never consulted

5

with you about this matter.

6

THE COURT:

All right.

7

MR. GREENWOOD:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. GREENWOOD:

I'd like to hear from you first.
My clients have not been involved with

you.

11

that.

12

you had jurisdiction (inaudible).

They don't recognize you.

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:

17

They don't recall anything like

All their property is in Heber City, so I don't know if

13

clearer.

16

Mr. Greenwood9

The witness was going to say something.

10

15

Okay.

Thank you very much.

Could you speak a little louder or

I can't understand you.
THE COURT:

I will do that, and I'll direct that the

parties do that as well.

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

Thank you.

And I'll speak up.

Thank you very much.

20

MONEVES BOREN

21

having been first duly sworn,

22

testifies as follows:

23

DIRECT EXAMINATION

24
25

They've

BY MR. BIRCH:
Q.

Thank you for being here today, MonevesT

Could you tell

Tab 5
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THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3

Thank you very much.

Please take the

witness stand.

4
5

I do.

MR. GREENWOOD:

If I go too quick, your Honor, just say,

"Slow down," okay?

6

THE COURT:

All right.

You may proceed.

7

DIANA LANCE

8

having been first duly sworn,

9

testifies as follows:

10
11

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GREENWOOD:

12

Q.

Please tell us your name.

13

A.

Diana Lance.

14

Q.

Where do you reside, Diana?

15

A.

At 292 West Main in Midway.

16

Q.

Do you own property in Heber City?

17

A.

I do.

18

Q.

Describe that property to us.

19

A.

We own a little over nine acres between -- the south

20

bounda ry is actually 91 North, but off of 600 West.

21

109 North and goes to about 205 North.

It starts at

22

Q.

How long have you owned that property?

23

A.

Since 1991.

24

Q.

When did you first become acquainted with that property?

25

A.

We were looking for property in the spring of 1991 to

}
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A.

I resided on -- I can't remember the address, but it was

2

on the other side of the depot grounds when it was the depot

3

ground s and the railroad tracks, Midway Lane.

4
5

Q.

Are you familiar with the property that's in question

today, namely property at 205 West, 6 -- 205 North 600 West?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Describe to us that property.

8

A.

That's my grandparents' home.

9

Q.

Your grandparents were whom?

10

A.

Frank and Maude Whitt.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

No, but I stayed with them lots.

13

Q.

Tell us when you stayed with them.

14

A.

I stayed with them every weekend until I was probably 16

15

or 17.

16

Q.

17
18
19
20
21

Okay.

What is it there?

Did you ever work for them?

I'm not going to look for ages here, but what

dates -- what years would that be in?
A.

It would have been from probably -- I stayed there when

I was real little.
Q.

Probably from 1945 to 1957.

Let me hand you an exhibit, Exhibit 5-A.

there appears to be a lane.

In that photo

Do you see that?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Describe to us what that lane is that you see.

24

A.

That was the driveway to my grandparents' property.

25

Their back fen -- their back way into their house was by my

-2651

grandfather's grainery on the -- they'd go in on the left there.

2

Then the car sheds where they parked their cars was a little bit

3

farther down on the left.

4

there was a open -- a gate that opened that went into a large

5

corral, and then there was a huge barn there and an opening that

6

came out from the corral on the other side into the field.

Then the grainery was next.

Then

7

Q.

8

and ^50 's?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Can you describe to the Court where those fences were?

11

A.

My grandmother had a fence around her property to keep

Do you remember any fences being present in the

12

the cattle and stuff off of her —

13

garden.

14

side to the back part where they went into the house.

out of her flowers and her

It went around the whole front of the house, down the

15

Q.

What was it made of?

16 !

A.

Wood.

17

Q.

Do you see it in that photo?

18

A.

No, but it should be there.

19

Q.

Okay.

20
21
22 i

J

All right.

Probably can't see it.

Were there any other —

now that

fence extended back to how far?
A.

Q.

It only went back as far as the grainery.
And how -- can you see the grainery in that photo?

23

A.

Not in this photo.

24

Q.

Probably not.

25

MO's

It went back to the grainery.

mentioned that there was a gate --

Now you

-2661 I

A.

Not -- excuse me, I take that back.

It was not the

2

grainery, it was right next to the fence -- the fence where we

3

went into the back of their house, my grandfather had a -- like a

4

tool shop.

5

work things in there.

6

was the grainery, and the fence only went to that shop.

7

Q.

8
9

He did all -- he kept all of his tools, all of his

Let me hand you Exhibit 5-F.
THE COURT:

the —

Then there was a carport and then there

So that my notes are correct, Ms. Housell,

there's a tool —

10

THE WITNESS:

11

THE COURT:

there's a tool shop first?

Uh-huh.

And we're talking about those out buildings

12

that are on the —

would have been the north property line, the

13

north side of your parents -- your grandparents' property?

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

16

THE WITNESS:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE WITNESS:

Uh-huh.
There's a tool shed first if I'm walking
Yeah.
—

east, and then what

—

Uh-huh.

And then what building?
Then there was a carport, a large one.

21

They put their vehicles in there, and they had all kinds of

22

assorted stuff in there.

23

THE COURT:

24

THE WITNESS:

25

—

And then -It had an entry way on both sides, on the

back side and the front side.
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THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS:

3

THE COURT:

4

Okay.

Then the grainery9

And then the gramery.
Okay.

Again, how far back did that wooden

fence go?

5

THE WITNESS:

To the tool shop, and then it would

6

have -- it stopped there and then it came up through the other

7

part of the yard.

8

gramery to the -- I mean you couldn't put your car in the

9

garages if there was a fence.

10
11
12

THE COURT:
Q.

A.

14

maybe.

15

Q.

17

Okay.

BY MR. GREENWOOD:

Thank you.
How far back from the gramery was

the Whitt barn?

13

16

There was no fence on that part from the

There was a big corral and then the barn; 200 feet

Okay.

Do you remember seeing a barn on the neighbor's

property, the McNaughton property?
A.

When I -- I don't know if I --

about a barn.

Mostly

18

what I remember about their property is the swings on the big

19

trees over there.

20
21
22

Q.

Okay.

Describe to the Court the big trees and where

they are located.
A.

They were —

there was two trees, and they had swings on

23

them.

My grandfather was very, very definite with my brother and

24

I that we were not to climb over that fence and go swing on those

25

trees.

He said, "If you want to go swimming in the canal you go

Tat -
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Q.

Tell the Court how you're familiar with it.

2

A.

Well, when I was -- when I first started -- I was

3

probably eight or nine-years-old, I used to take cows back and

4

forth to pasture for the McNaughtons.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

And --

7

Q.

Go ahead.

8

A.

Then --

9

Q.

And you worked for the McNaughtons?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

Were you aware where the Whitt property is in

relation to that McNaughton property?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Yes.

15

Now --

Did you ever take cows along the boundary between

the Whitt and the McNaughton property?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Okay.

Describe for the Court what you mean to be the

18

boundary in the properties.

19

photo.

20

A.

Exhibit No. 5-A, let me hand you a

Can you identify what's in that photo?
Yes.

The Link McNaughton house is to the north.

21

MR. BIRCH:

May I approach, your Honor?

22

THE COURT:

Yeah.

23

MR. GREENWOOD:

24

MR. BIRCH:

25

Exhibit 5-A.

You --

It's 5-A.

See which photo.

Sorry.

Thank you.
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property.

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

4

Where on the frontage?
Just —

north.

5

THE COURT:

6

THE WITNESS:

7

THE COURT:

8
9

oh, probably about 150 feet to the

Q.

To the north of what?
To the north of the property line.

Okay.

BY MR. GREENWOOD:

Was it to the north of the house to

south of the house?

10

A.

North.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

That was before the house was built.

13

Q.

And after?

14

A.

They had

15

Q.

Well, was the access still there after the house was

16

built?

17

A.

18

house.

19

Q.

So the front willow trees --

20

A.

But there was an iron gate there to the —

21

Yes.

After the house was built?

—

Well, the trees was taken down when they built the

well, no,

first there was a wire gate to the north of the house.

22

Q,

So there was a wired gate on the front --

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

—

25

A.

Before the house was built there was a wire gate right

of the house?
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A.

Well --

2

Q.

By that I mean the one on the south side.

3

A.

On the south side of the --

4

Q.

On the south side of the lane.

5

A.

Of the lane over here.

6

Q.

Right.

7

A.

Okay.

8

The one that's through the locusts now.
There was an old wire fence around the house

here.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

And back before then there was a grainery and a storage

11

shed, and then a wooden fence and then the barn.

12

Q.

So the wooden fence went right back to the barn?

13

A.

Yeah.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

Did you —

do you recall how far off of 6th West

the barn sat or how far back it was?

16

A.

Approximately 150 feet, maybe 200.

17

Q.

Maybe 200?

18

Okay.

Do you recall how wide the lane was

from the fence to the edge of the -- well, how wide the lane was?

19

A.

How wide the lane was?

20

Q.

Yeah.

21

A.

I would say, just roughly guessing, about 40 feet.

22

MR. BIRCH:

23

(Counsel confers with client)

24

MR. BIRCH:

25 77/

Okay.

One moment, your Honor.

No further questions, your Honor.
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Q.

Are you able to tell the Court -- are you able to give

2

your -- what's your estimate of the distance between 6th West and

3

the Whi tt barn?

4

A.

I'm just taking a guess here, 175, 150 --

5

Q.

Okay, but you measure off of photographs, correct?

6

A.

Yes.

7
8
9

measure d, but
Q.

Well, you're asking me one that I haven't
—

Okay.

You've indicated that from 2nd -- no, from the

propert y over to this northern access was about 150, right?

10

A.

Yeah, 150, 175.

11

Q.

So I'm asking you how far you think it is from 6th West

12
13
14

to the Whitt barn.
A.

Okay.

You're talking about the center line or are you

talking about the right of way?

15

Q.

No, I'm talking about the road, 6th West.

16

A.

Center line?

17

Q.

Sure.

18

A.

About 150, 100 -- thereabouts to this barn back here?

19

Q.

Uh-huh.

20

So you believe that the property boundary to

this access is the same as 6th West to this barn?

21

A.

It looks like it's pretty close.

22

Q.

Okay.

Are you able to see the residue of the barn in

23

Exhibit -- residue, that's not a good word.

24

barn in Exhibit 44?

25

A.

Yes, right here.

The remnants of the

|

